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 i 
Abstract 
This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether 
Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate 
Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the 
relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of 
corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow 
Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and 
no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America. 
This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project 
focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and 
composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second 
project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested 
whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether 
board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were 
related to firm value. 
Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to 
2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm 
value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no 
relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either 
Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a 
Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict 
previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate 
Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous 
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research by reporting no relationship between these variables. 
This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess 
the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. . 
Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is 
important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are 
positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both 
foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and 
Mexico. 
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1  Linking Document 
1.1 Introduction 
The introduction will discuss the business issue that is the main focus of two 
economic studies in emerging markets. It also discusses the research questions 
that arise from the review of relevant literature. The Cranfield DBA consists of 
three major projects whose findings and contributions are presented here. 
1.1.1 Corporate Governance – The effectiveness of Corporate Governance in 
emerging markets 
This research was inspired by the on-going business quest of trying to assess 
whether corporate governance has any impact on firm value in emerging markets. 
Literature on this topic has been scarce and was mostly written before the 
corporate scandals of the late 90´s and the early 00´s. The Sarbanes – Oxley act 
(from now on SOX), based on Agency theory, was adopted as a response to those 
scandals. One of its most important requirements focuses on the structure and 
composition of the Board of Directors. It set limits for board size and composition. 
The amount of literature that discusses the impact of SOX is limited. Following 
SOX, most emerging markets in Latin America published and adopted Corporate 
Governance regulations in the mid 00´s, which provides an interesting context for 
finding whether either board characteristics or Corporate Governance laws have a 
positive impact on firm value. 
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1.1.2 Justification for research 
Unlike other developed markets, little research has been done on this topic in the 
Latin American emerging markets. The author looked initially at Colombia as a 
subject for his research but later expanded the scope of study to include Mexico 
since the analytical approach was also applicable for research in Mexico. The 
justification for selecting these emerging markets for research was based on the 
following factors present in their economies: 
1.1.2.1  Privatizations:  
Over the last two decades a fair number of companies have been privatized and 
subsequently listed in the Colombian Stock Exchange, these companies come from 
different industries such as telecommunications (ETB- 2006), utilities (ISA - 2002), 
and oil (Ecopetrol - 2007). Privatization of public sector companies helps economic 
development by bringing resources to the government, funds to the company and 
investment alternatives to investors. Good corporate governance practices are 
very important since their presence give new investors confidence, promoting the 
liquidity of company stock. Literature on privatization and corporate governance is 
recent but limited with Dyck (2001) and Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2004) 
mentioning the importance of corporate governance practices on successful 
privatizations. Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2004) in their study on privatizations 
in Mexico found that privatization led to improved performance in firms mostly 
from productivity gains (64%) with good corporate governance playing an 
important role in these gains. They believed that good governance leads to easier 
and better access to capital markets, which means a lower cost of capital 
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immediately creating higher corporate value. (Dyck, 2001; Chong and Lopez de 
Silanes, 2004) 
1.1.2.2 Reforms to pension funds:  
In the early 90´s privately owned pension funds came into existence in Colombia (a 
national government run pension system was created in the mid 60´s with poor 
results). The creation of such funds let people manage their pension plans and 
promoted an increase in savings by offering tax benefits. It also helped capital 
markets develop by increasing their liquidity. Pension funds are considered 
institutional investors and their returns are closely monitored by the Finance 
Control commission (Superintendencia financiera). Since they manage people’s 
pension money they cannot run the risk of value destruction as the result of an 
agency problem, for this reason they value corporate governance positively. Since 
2001 pension funds are only permitted to invest in companies with good corporate 
governance practices. Those practices were not defined properly until 2005 with 
the publication of law 964 of 2005. 
Literature on pension fund reforms and corporate governance is scarce and 
studies for Latin America are even scarcer. Asher (2001) in his study on Pension 
reform, capital markets, and corporate governance for Malaysia concludes that a 
pension reform cannot be effective in terms of value creation if it is not 
accompanied simultaneously by financial and capital markets reforms as well as 
improved corporate governance. Catalán (2004) in his study on Pension Funds and 
corporate governance in developing countries mentions that pension fund reforms 
lead to pro-investor legal reforms but concludes that there is not enough evidence 
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that these laws are eventually enforced. He also mentions that there is little 
evidence on the effect that pension funds lead to stock market development and 
that this can be an interesting research topic. He defines specific areas for future 
research (he calls them “what we need to know”) such as: - The link between 
pension funds, ownership structure and performance, - The link between pension 
funds and stock market development and the role that corporate governance plays 
in this development. (Asher, 2001; Catalán, 2004)   
1.1.2.3 Need to compete globally:  
This is very much related to the preceding section in that global competition goes 
beyond operational variables and more into cost of capital.  Both Colombia and 
Mexico promote foreign investment and consider it an important source of 
economic development. Since foreign investors behave like institutional investors 
they also value Corporate Governance positively. 
1.1.2.4 Concentration of ownership – presence of large business groups:  
In Colombia and Mexico, following the trend from Continental Europe and Asia   
(Claessens e al, 2000) there is a lot of ownership concentration in the hands of a 
few families or business groups for both listed and unlisted companies. Gutierrez, 
Pombo and Taborda (2008) provide evidence on ownership concentration in 
Colombia and mention that their results are similar to the ones found in 
continental Europe. They also mention that indirect ownership is present via 
pyramidal and cross shareholding ownership schemes (pg 22).  With this evidence 
the protection of minority shareholders becomes an important issue for governing 
bodies. (Claessens et al., 2000, Gutierrez, Pombo and Taborda, 2008). 
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All of the above mentioned factors support the justification for not only proceeding 
to a systematic review of the literature but also for empirical research in Colombia 
and Mexico. 
1.1.3 The Study 
As mentioned in the introduction, Cranfields DBA consists of three main 
projects: The systematic review of literature followed by two empirical 
projects. All three projects are summarized as follows: 
1.1.3.1 Systematic Literature Review 
The systematic literature review (Project 1) focuses on the ongoing 
discussion on the effectiveness of Corporate Governance as a 
mechanism to solve the agency conflict.  105 papers were chosen for 
deeper analysis. These papers study mainly two topics, the board of 
directors and its relationship with corporate value, and the impact that 
governance reforms have on firm value. The vast majority of them are 
empirical papers, which provide evidence either in favor or against 
agency theory (Governance reforms such as SOX are based on agency 
theory). From the review of all papers available the author identified 
gaps in the literature and proposes the following research questions: 
- Are Board of director’s size and composition related to firm value 
in emerging markets?  
- Are governance reforms positively related to firm value in 
emerging markets? 
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The two empirical projects, using data from two emerging markets in 
Latin America provide evidence that help the author in answering the 
research questions. 
1.1.3.2 First Empirical Project – Colombia 
The first empirical project used information from Colombia (the 
author’s home country). The main reasons for using Colombian 
information as evidence are the following: First, Colombia merged its 
three exchanges into one in 2001 and has both been a focus of foreign 
investment and has had a strong development of institutional 
investors such as pension funds which value strong corporate 
governance and second, the Colombian governing body issued and 
implemented a governance law in 2005 (Law 964). This law, following 
SOX guidelines issued requirements for both board size and 
composition, which were part of the research question. Enough 
information was found and used with data from both before and after 
the law was issued giving the author a valuable sample.  The statistical 
model (Panel data with a linear regression) used for this project is 
similar with most papers reviewed.  
1.1.3.3 Second Empirical Project – Mexico 
The second empirical project can be used both as an independent 
paper and/or a complement to the first empirical project. It used 
information from companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange for a 
period of over ten years. Mexico is similar to Colombia in the fact that 
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both are emerging markets with weak legal systems and weak 
shareholder protections (La Porta et al., 1999, Klapper and Love, 
2003). However Mexico presents new and different elements such as a 
much bigger economy, bigger companies, more concentrated family 
ownership and most importantly, CEO duality. Mexico, as Colombia, 
tried to protect shareholders by establishing new corporate 
governance reforms, the last of them being “Ley del Mercado de 
Valores” of 2005. The sample used for this project included data for 
periods from both before and after the law’s implementation thus 
validating it as a perfect study target. The same methodology as the 
one used for Colombia was used in this project. 
1.1.4 Findings and Contribution 
This subsection presents the findings and contribution from the research. 
There is a significant contribution to empirical evidence and to knowledge 
of practice. 
1.1.4.1 Findings and empirical contribution 
Both Projects 2 and 3 studied the relationship between board 
attributes such as size and composition, and firm value for the 
emerging markets of Colombia and Mexico and the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm value for Mexico (where duality is 
allowed). Results show that there is no relationship between any of the 
above mentioned corporate governance variables and firm value for 
either Colombia or Mexico. 
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This represents a contribution to empirical evidence since studies of 
these topics have never been done for this region or for these two 
countries independently. 
This research also studied the relationship between corporate 
governance reforms (based on SOX) and firm value for these two 
countries. Results are mixed with Colombia showing a positive 
relationship while Mexico shows no relationship between corporate 
governance laws and firm value. As this area of research is still not 
fully developed these findings are an important contribution to it. 
1.1.4.2 Contribution to knowledge of practice 
Results from this research are useful to different stakeholders.  
Institutional and foreign investors (specifically Private Equity funds) 
value corporate governance and findings from this research can help 
them in focusing which board of directors (one corporate governance 
vehicle) attributes are more or less useful in each country.  
Results from this research contradict anecdotical evidence and go 
beyond the intuition proposed by agency theory in which more 
monitoring and smaller boards necessarily create value. Results 
support Renders and Garenmyck (2012) who argue that the severity of 
the agency conflicts affects the effectiveness of Corporate governance. 
They suggest   that the common principle of “one size fits all”  is not 
applicable for European companies. These results are also important 
for managers since better corporate governance decreases risk and 
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thus allows for easier and better financing. It is also important for 
managers who seek to appoint a board of directors that can create 
value by focusing on company needs rather than on SOX and local 
regulations. 
The results on Corporate Governance laws and their relationship with 
firm value are useful to regulators and government in their quest to 
develop capital markets and to help economies grow by questioning 
the effectiveness of their laws. With the merger of the Peruvian, 
Chilean and Colombian exchanges and the future merger with the 
Mexican Exchange corporate governance regulations and 
recommendations will become an important issue for market 
development. Colombia´s Stock Exchange is currently considering  
development  of  a “Corporate Governance” think tank that will  help 
develop better corporate governance practices. 
This represents an important contribution to the knowledge of 
practice. 
1.2 Theoretical Positioning 
Agency Theory & Stewardship Theory 
This research is from the field of finance, specifically in the subsection of corporate 
governance. 
As found in the systematic review of literature, most finance research on 
corporate governance is based on Agency theory.  Agency Theory is based on the 
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conflict of interest between managers (agents) and owners (principals). It was 
first mentioned briefly by Adam Smith in “The wealth of Nations” (1776), initially 
studied by Berle and Means (1932) and later developed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who believe that both managers and shareholders are utility maximizers 
and act accordingly, meaning that if their interests are not aligned, then a principal 
agent problem arises which can potentially affect a firm’s performance.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe that “monitoring and bonding costs” need to 
be incurred in order to make sure that managers act on behalf of shareholders. 
They call these costs agency costs and define them as the sum of the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures (both pecuniary and non 
pecuniary) by the agent and the residual loss (the welfare lost by the principal due 
to the misalignment of interests).  
Managers try to maximize their own personal welfare and that comes via 
dividends if they own company stock and/or via management compensation 
(salary and benefits). With concentrated ownership in the hands of the manager, 
cash flow rights of ownership are not affected by management´s behavior, 
however with dispersed ownership managers only have limited cash flow rights of 
ownership and might look for special benefits (compensation) through decisions 
that may not create shareholder value. Cash flow rights are one of the important 
sources of the agency conflict (Jensen, 1986). As cash flow rises, agency costs rise 
accordingly since managers will have more power by having more financial 
resources under their control and may be tempted to either take advantage of the 
situation or even promote growth beyond optimal size (Jensen, 2004).  
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Since corporate assets are financed by either equity and/or debt, managers use 
debt to lower financing costs. Acquiring debt also creates agency costs of debt that 
appear in the form of incentive effects, explained as owner/managers making 
decisions that bring large payoffs with low probability of success since the cost of 
failure will be borne by the creditors in highly leveraged firms. 
Jensen (2004) based on his initial study and using stock market data defines a new 
agency cost called “the agency costs of overvalued equity”. Since stock markets 
place an important value on growth and short-term results, managers looking to 
succeed are motivated (and eventually paid) to lie and manipulate corporate 
financial reports. This results in an inappropriate valuation of companies. 
La Porta et al. (2000), studied ownership around the world and found that 
ownership is more concentrated in countries outside the US especially in 
countries with low shareholder protection. As investors increase their equity 
positions they are more inclined to look after their investment thus incurring 
additional agency costs. La Porta et al (2000) Lins (2003), Klapper and Love 
(2005) mention that as ownership concentration increases then a new agency 
problem appears, that of misalignment of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
It is important to mention that both Sarbanes Oxley and Latin American 
governance laws are based on Agency theory and their proposals for board size 
and composition follow its principles. 
Stewardship theory proposes a different view. The word steward goes back to 
monarchical times where a person serves and represents the monarchy, and thus 
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is not expected to act as an independent agent with interests different than the 
ones of the principal. Following this line of thought, managers that act as stewards 
create value just by representing the principals properly. 
The organizational structure that optimizes “steward type” managers is one where 
managers have total authority over the company. CEO duality, a common 
leadership structure found in Mexico is an example of such structure. Agency 
Theory has a strong argument for no duality while Stewardship Theory supports 
it. 
1.3 Research Process and Methods 
This section summarizes the research process and methodology used for the 
scoping study and the three research projects. 
1.3.1 Research Framework 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Following Van de Ven (2007) there are four necessary activities to do a research 
project: problem formulation, theory building, research design and problem 
solving. The first one consists of taking a research question to reality, theory 
building develops conceptually a model that develops the problem in a particular 
context, the third one takes the problem to reality using the conceptual model and 
finally the problem solving that uses results from empirical solution to solve the 
question.  
This research follows this methodology by defining a research question (problem 
formulation), by positioning the research within a theoretical framework (theory 
building), by proposing samples of information as evidence to be tested by using a 
statistical model (research design) and by providing answers to the research 
questions (problem solving). Step one was to propose a research question that 
focused on the relationship between board of directors and firm value and on the 
impact of governance reforms, both these questions in emerging markets. The 
second step was the literature review in which through an extensive research a 
well-developed conceptual framework was established. Projects 2 and 3 brought 
all this process to reality and to empirical testing in emerging economies such as 
Colombia and Mexico. In both projects through empirical testing conclusions were 
made that were the final step to answer the initial problem. 
1.3.2  Scoping study 
The scoping study plays an important role in Cranfields DBA, its purpose is to 
make sure that the research issue has been properly identified and that the 
  29 
systematic review questions are well defined. The end result of the scoping study 
provided both a clear motivation for research and a systematic review protocol. 
The initial review of the literature performed in the scoping study gave the author 
a deeper knowledge of agency theory and its relation to modern corporate 
governance, however literature provided mixed evidence on its relationship to 
firm value providing support for a deeper understanding of this via a systematic 
review of the literature. In the scoping study questions were asked with only a 
specific emerging market (Colombia) in mind but questions and issues that arise 
from it apply to other emerging markets  (Mexico). 
Through the development of the Systematic review protocol the initial review 
questions were established: What is the relationship between a board of director’s 
characteristics and firm value in emerging markets? Does theory (and later on 
evidence) support law on board of director characteristics? 
1.3.3 Systematic Literature Review – Project 1 
1.3.3.1 Why a systematic literature review 
Only through an exhaustive literature review gaps can be found and research 
questions developed thus making it necessary to any research project. This process 
allowed the author to properly understand the available literature on the subject.  
1.3.3.2 Process and Key Findings 
The first step in developing the systematic literature review was to understand 
which topics were needed. As mentioned in the scoping study three main topics 
were taken into consideration: firm value, board of director’s characteristics and 
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governance reforms. Research papers that took under consideration at least two of 
these topics were included in the literature review process. 
Following Cranfield´s methodology a methodical process was developed, one that 
included: 
o Definition of databases to be searched 
o Development of search strings to be used 
o Definition of a grading system  
The end result of the process was the selection of 105 research papers to be fully 
reviewed. From all of these papers, information about general characteristics 
such as country/countries of study, type of document, main topic or its 
relationship with value were taken into consideration and grouped together to 
simplify the work. 
Some of the papers selected were already studied for the scoping studies but a 
significant amount were new and were studied carefully. Research and evidence 
provide mixed results on the relationship between Board of Directors 
characteristics and firm value, mainly because there is no unique rule of thumb 
for Board of Directors role in corporate life. The two more studied characteristics 
of Board of Directors are size and composition, the evidence on both their 
relationships with firm value is also mixed.  
As with literature on Board size and composition, literature on Governance 
Reforms and their relationship with value is very limited, even for developed 
economies (literature on SOX and Cadbury act), which again provides an 
interesting opportunity for research. 
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1.3.4 First Empirical Study – Project 2 
1.3.4.1 Empirical research methodology, philosophy and design 
Project 2 used a quantitative statistical methodology. The choice for such a 
methodology follows most financial research methodology, where regressions are 
used to find statistical relationships among different variables. The author chose to 
use linear regressions with Tobins Q, a proxy for value, as the dependent variable 
with governance variables  (board size, percentage of independent directors, 
governance laws) and some control variables  (GDP Growth, sales, stock liquidity 
and lag of Tobins Q) as independent variables.  Since companies were compared 
with each other among a 10-year period, a panel and year dummy variables were 
used to check for time varying effects. To check for endogeneity, a common 
problem in this kind of research, the author ran regressions with dependent 
variables as independent and vice versa and found no endogeneity among the 
variables.  
Initially only liquid listed companies were included in the data sample for Project 
2, but the small number of observations decreased the robustness of the results 
and all listed companies were included in data simple. 
The methodology used is consistent with most of the literature, which provides 
robustness to the findings. 
1.3.4.2 Process and Key findings 
In this paper the author studied three main corporate governance issues within 
the Colombian context, first whether board size has any impact on firm value, 
second whether more independent boards lead to higher firm value and last 
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whether the Corporate Governance law, Law 964 of 2005, had a positive impact on 
firm value. Results show that board size is not significantly related to firm value for 
Colombia. They also show that board composition is not related to firm value, thus 
providing evidence to conclude that there is no relationship between board 
structure variables such as size and composition and firm value for Colombian 
listed companies. Implementation and adoption of Law 964 of 2005 shows a 
significant positive relationship with higher firm value.  
This paper adds to literature by providing evidence of the relationship of board 
characteristics and governance reforms on value for an emerging market such as 
Colombia.  
1.3.5 Second Empirical Study – Project 3 
1.3.5.1 Empirical research methodology, philosophy and design 
Project 3 used the same methodology as Project 2. A new variable was included 
(CEO Duality) with other governance variables (board size, board composition, 
governance law, family ownership) as control variables. The data sample for 
Mexico included more observations for two reasons, there are more listed 
companies in the Mexican market and observations for one more year were 
included (more information was available). The same robustness checks that were 
done for Colombia were also done for Mexico. 
1.3.5.2 Process and Key findings 
This project studied the effects of CEO duality on firm value in an emerging market 
focusing on Mexico where CEO duality is allowed. This is important since previous 
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research on CEO duality`s impact on firm value is mixed and inconclusive. Latin 
American countries such as Colombia, where previous research was conducted 
support agency theory and do not allow the same individual to be both CEO and 
Chairman of the board. Since other governance variables such as board 
independence and size might have an impact on value they were used as control 
variables in the study. 
This research found that CEO duality has no impact on value for Mexico thus 
showing that different leadership structures do not affect value within an 
emerging market context such as Mexico.   
Most of the governance variables included in this research do not appear to have a 
definite relationship with value for emerging markets therefore further research 
on this topic is needed. 
Further research can be conducted on different governance variables (such as 
management ownership, block holder ownership, compensation, board dynamics 
and specific family characteristics – generation, involvement) and their 
relationship with value to be able to assess whether governance is really important 
in emerging markets. These variables were not included in this research and might 
provide deeper knowledge for academics, investors and regulators. 
1.4 Discussion of findings and contributions 
This section includes the discussion of the findings and contributions of the three 
research projects. Table 1 shows the domains and extent of the contribution (as 
proposed by Cranfield researchers). Section 4.1 presents and discusses both what 
is already present in the literature and what is missing (gaps in the literature). 
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Section 4.2 presents the findings and contribution of the research. There are 
significant contributions to empirical evidence and to knowledge of practice. 
1.4.1 Extant Knowledge and Gaps 
1.4.1.1 Board Size and Value 
Yermack (1996) mentions that as Board size increases value is destroyed due to 
slower decision making. Mak and Kusnadi (2005), De Andres et al (2005), Gill and 
Marthur (2011), Ujunwa (2012) and Kumar and Singh (2013) provide supporting 
evidence for Singapore and Malaysia, OECD countries, Canadian Manufacturing 
firms, Nigeria and India respectively. Jakling and Johl (2009) provide contradicting 
evidence while studying Indian top companies. Coles et al (2008) challenge this 
view and mention that both very small and very large boards have a positive 
influence on value due to the complexity of businesses. Boone et al (2008) reports 
that size is not a driver of value but a function of size and that as firm size 
increases so does its board. This can be explained by the fact that as firms grow 
they usually diversify and require more support not only for monitoring but also 
for advising (a new role of Boards not presented in theoretical foundation papers). 
Raheja (2005) presents a theoretical model that concludes that there is no optimal 
size since business complexity and firm size differ among companies. This 
argument challenges Sarbanes-Oxley´s recommendation (and Colombian and 
Mexican law on Corporate Governance) on an ideal board size for corporations 
(Wintoki, 2007). Literature on the relationship between board size and firm value 
for the emerging markets of Latin America is nonexistent. 
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1.4.1.2 Board Composition and value 
Literature on Board Composition (characteristics) is more plentiful than literature 
on board size. There is mixed evidence on board composition and its positive 
influence on firm value. The logic behind the argument proposed by SOX (a 
minimum percentage of outsiders) is based upon the hypothesis that outsiders 
provide better monitoring of management (thus decreasing agency costs) because 
they are independent. Jackling and Johl (2009) and Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) 
support this argument for India and Spain. While this may be true it is also true 
that companies sometimes need more advice, and insiders tend to know more 
about the business and can provide better insight to the Board. The benefits of this 
support can offset the agency cost reductions that outside directors may provide. 
This contradicts SOX recommendations (Wintoki, 2007). Barnard and Rosenstein 
(1996), Hermalin and Weisenbach (2001), De Andres et al (2005) and Baghat and 
Black (1998) suggest that Board structure does not show a positive relationship 
with performance (value), Colombo and Baglioni (2008) provide evidence from 
Italy on a positive relationship contradicting prior studies. As with Board size it is 
equally accepted that there is no ideal Board composition. Board structure should 
be based on corporate reality, especially on the company’s priority between advice 
(more insiders) and monitoring (more outsiders) (Harris and Ravis, 2005; Lehn et 
al, 2004; Link et al , 2008; Denis and Sarin, 1999). Thus a Board make-up should 
be based on the quantification of the benefits of advice versus the agency costs of 
not monitoring. Opportunities for research arise from the fact that this 
quantification is a very difficult one. A few studies (Dahya et al, 2006) even report 
that Board of Directors are related to ownership structures providing further 
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academic evidence regarding the impossibility of a standard size or composition of 
corporate boards. These studies present an important issue to be taken into 
account, which is the possible co-linearity between ownership structure and 
Board of Directors size and composition.  No literature was found on Board of 
Directors composition in Latin America. Both the lack of formal Board size and 
composition studies found, and the evidence that there is no uniform or standard 
Board composition support the rationale for conducting research on Corporate 
Governance in Colombia and/or Mexico. 
1.4.1.3 Governance Reforms and value 
As mentioned before literature on this topic is scarce due to the fact that current 
law was adopted less than 20 years ago. Sarbanes Oxley follows agency theory 
principles, putting emphasis on board size and independence as vehicles to protect 
shareholders. Evidence shows no positive relationship between Sarbanes Oxley 
and firm value. Linck et al (2005), Wintoki (2007) and Basu and Dimitrov (2005) 
found no significant relationship between Corporate Governance reforms and firm 
value.  
As for laws or codes of best practices based on Sarbanes Oxley, Price et al (2011) 
found no relationship between recommendations (code of best practices) and firm 
value for Mexico.  
There is no research on the relationship between governance laws and value for 
emerging markets. 
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1.4.1.4 CEO Duality and value  
As with other governance variables, CEO duality literature presents mixed views 
on the relationship between CEO duality and value. CEO duality is supported by 
stewardship theory since it argues for a stronger more united leadership where 
interests are aligned and where advice more than control is needed. Agency 
theory on the other hand does not support CEO duality because it limits the 
board’s main responsibility of monitoring the CEO. Literature presents mixed 
evidence on the relationship between CEO duality and firm value.  Authors such as 
Faleye (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Vintila and Gherghina (2012), Braun, Sharma 
(2007), Raluca (2013) and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) found no relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance/value. Other authors such as Daily and Dalton 
(1992), Cho and Kim, (2007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003), Chen et al (2005) Chanie and Thome, (2009), Ehikoya (2009), lam and Lee 
(2008), Pok and Sheik, (2012) and Dogan et al. (2013) support agency theory in its 
assessment of a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Finally, 
authors such as Agrawal and Knoebler (1996), Peng, Zhang and Li (2007), Yang 
and Zhao (2014) and Baptista, Klotze and Campelo de Melo (2008) support 
stewardship theory and find a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm 
value. 
Research on the relationship between CEO Duality and firm value for the emerging 
markets of Latin America where it is allowed is nonexistent. 
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1.4.2 Findings and contributions 
The contributions of this research address the gaps in the literature mentioned in 
the prior section. As mentioned before this research provides significant 
contributions to empirical evidence and to knowledge of practice. The following 
sections will discuss both the findings and the respected contributions. 
1.4.2.1 Findings and Empirical contribution 
Projects 2 and 3 provide empirical results to the research questions on the 
relationship between Board of Directors characteristics such as size and 
composition, CEO Duality, and Governance laws and firm value for the emerging 
markets of Colombia and Mexico. 
Project 2, which studied the relationship between board size and composition, and 
governance reforms and value for Colombia provided the following results:  
 Board size shows no significant relationship with value. This supports Lehn 
et al (2009), Boone (2007), Bonn (2004) and Di Pietra (2008) who also 
found no relationship between Board size and value. It also contradicts 
agency theory, which recommends a small board. 
 Board composition (Independence) shows no relationship to firm value. 
This result supports Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001) , De Andres et al (2005) and Baghat and Black (1998), 
who in their research on board composition found no significant 
relationship between board independence and value. This result can 
probably explained by explanations such as the ones from authors such as 
Harris and Ravis (2005), Lehn et al (2009) and Dennis and Sarin (1999) 
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who argue that there is no ideal board composition, as it should be 
determined by the monitoring and/or advising needs of each company. 
 Governance reforms such as Law 964 of 2005 show a positive significant 
relationship with value. This result contradicts previous literature (Price et 
al, 2011 and Wintoki, 2007); however when looking at specific components 
of the law, i.e. board size and independence, results find them not related to 
firm value. 
Project 3 studied the relationship between CEO Duality and firm value for Mexico, 
a country that allows for the CEO and the Chairman of the board to be the same 
person. The research for Mexico used board size and independence as control 
variables. The results are the following: 
 Board size as in the case of Colombia (Project 2) shows no significant 
relationship with value. Boards in Mexico show higher numbers of 
directors than in Colombia (probably due to the fact that companies in 
Mexico are bigger), but again no relationship is found between size and 
firm value.  Again, this result supports Lehn et al (2009), Boone (2007), 
Bonn (2004) and Di Pietra (2008).This result also contradicts agency 
theory.  
 Results on Board composition are similar to the ones found for Colombia. 
Board composition (Independence) shows no relationship to firm value. 
These results support Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001) , De Andres et al (2005) and Baghat and Black (1998). 
 Results of the relationship between Governance reforms and firm value for 
Mexico contradict Project 2 results (from Colombia) by finding no 
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relationship between reforms and value. They support previous literature 
(Price et al, 2011 and Wintoki, 2007) by finding no relationship between 
reforms and value. 
 Results on CEO duality show no relationship between the governance 
variable and firm value for Mexico. This result neither supports nor 
contradicts Agency theory. Results from Mexico support authors such as 
Braun, Sharma (2007) and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008), using evidence from 
largely US family controlled companies, find no relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. Raluca (2013) and Amba (2013) used 
evidence from Bahrain and Romania and found similar results. 
This research study presents new empirical data contributing to the broader study 
of the relationship between board attributes, governance reforms, CEO Duality 
and firm value. 
The relationships between these concepts were studied in both Colombia and 
Mexico, two significant emerging markets where these concepts have not 
previously been studied.  
1.4.2.2 Contribution to knowledge of practice 
Both empirical projects provide useful information to practitioners on the 
relationship between board attributes and governance reforms and value for the 
emerging markets of Latin America. Mexico and Colombia have become the focus 
of foreign investment over the last few years. For investors a proper knowledge of 
governance relationship with value is useful in their assessment of inverisk. The 
findings from this research are also helpful for Colombian pension funds since 
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they are the largest institutional investor in the country with their investments 
regulated by law (only AAA risk investments are allowed). Even though these 
findings support part of the existing literature, the applicability is different since 
this research is the first of this kind for both countries where stakeholders are 
different. Results from this research show that conventional wisdom based on 
agency theory i.e., more monitoring and smaller boards create value is not 
necessarily applicable in emerging markets and thus managers and investors 
should focus on corporate reality and needs rather than just following intuition 
and general recommendations 
Governing bodies from both Mexico and Colombia can use the findings from this 
research in their quest to measure the impact of their regulations, improve 
regulatory effectiveness, and even question the theoretical foundations of 
regulations. (There is no relationship between Mexican law and value while there 
is a relationship between Colombian law and value but it is not related to board 
attributes).  Colombia´s exchange has put special emphasis on corporate 
governance evolution for listed companies (among the MILA region – Peru, Chile 
and Mexico) in order to develop its capital market. These findings are new to 
literature and thus can be considered as a contribution to the knowledge currently 
in practice. 
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Table 1 – Contribution to knowledge 
 
Domains of 
contribution 
Extent of contribution 
Theoretical 
Knowledge 
What has been found which is brand new 
Empirical 
Evidence 
- Relationship between Board Characteristics (Size, composition and CEO Duality) and firm 
value for Mexico and Colombia 
- Impact of Corporate Governance reforms on firm value for the emerging markets of Latin 
America 
Knowledge of 
practice 
 
- Governance Reforms based on Agency theory have had no impact on firm value for the 
emerging Markets on Latin America. 
- Board Characteristics such as Size and composition are not related to firm value for 
Colombia and Mexico 
- CEO Duality is not related to firm value for Mexico  
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1.5 Limitations and Opportunities for further research 
1.5.1 Limitations 
This research focused only on a limited number of governance attributes and their 
relationship with value within two emerging markets in Latin America. There are 
limitations worth mentioning: 
 Evidence is limited to small markets for a period of 10+ years which 
represents a limited number of observations 
 Only two countries were included for the region leaving countries such as Peru 
and Chile still to be studied. 
 Only board size, composition and CEO duality were included in the study, 
which left for later study other important governance variables such as: 
business group ownership, board diversity, board dynamics, etc. 
1.5.2 Opportunities for research 
As mentioned in the preceding section this research focused on specific 
governance mechanisms leaving put other important ones to be studied in the 
future. Regarding boards of directors a few variables may be important to 
additional research such as board capital, board diversity and board dynamics. 
The region shows low levels of equity markets development, which makes banks 
the biggest providers of capital. With banks bearing this responsibility their role in 
Corporate Governance becomes an important issue and thus is an additional 
element to be studied at greater depth (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Evolution of systematic literature 
As mentioned in the research structure and evolution of the research questions in 
the last chapter, there were changes in the literature review with the development 
of the empirical projects. The initial approach included two empirical projects that 
were going to be focused only in Colombia, they sought to analyse the relationship 
between Corporate Governance variables such as ownership and firm value in the 
first project and board characteristics and firm value in the second project. After 
starting to work on the data gathering for the first project the author realized that 
since ownership data for Colombia was very difficult to gather (large presence of 
Pyramidal structures, Gutierrez and Pombo, 2006) changes needed to be made, 
which altered the first empirical project to the relationship between Board 
Characteristics, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The 
second empirical project also changed, the author decided to do research with 
Mexican data since Mexico not only allows for a different Corporate Governance 
variable, CEO Duality but also has data for more companies.  
2.2 Introduction 
Corporate Governance is an important mechanism in mitigating the agency 
problem. Its main purpose is to guarantee creditors (in both equity and debt) an 
adequate return on their investment by making sure that management acts in 
their best interest. Corporate governance consists of both internal and external 
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mechanisms. Internal mechanisms such as Board of Directors size and 
composition play a very important role in mitigating the agency problem; their 
oversight role of management decreases agency costs thus increasing firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
Board of Directors are elected to play a monitoring role of management actions. 
Their responsibilities are mostly to define management compensation, to appoint 
and dismiss CEO´s, to decide on dividend payment policies and mostly to monitor 
results. Research on Boards of Directors has concentrated on US companies with 
conflicting results about its impact on firm value.  
The Sarbanes Oxley Act “SOX” (2002) was introduced and adopted as a response 
to the Corporate scandals of the late 90´s where the lack of proper Corporate 
Governance principles played a major role. SOX seeks to guarantee that 
management actions are subject to board oversight. Committees (with only 
independent directors from the Board) are created to review policies in key areas 
as well as decisions that encompass risk to the company. Rules on board 
characteristics are set such as majority on independent directors, annual elections 
of directors and limits on stock ownership by directors (SOX 303). It also 
requested among other things the certification of financial reports by directors 
(SOX 404) as a way of making sure that financial information accurately shows 
corporate reality. Clark (2005) reports that SOX proposed interesting changes but 
left large areas untouched such as the setting of executive compensation, the 
extraction of private benefits from controlling relationships (called by other 
authors as tunnelling), corporate governance rules on corporate transactions such 
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as mergers and acquisitions, empowerment of shareholders (beyond annual 
elections of directors) and rules on the enforcement of the mechanisms proposed. 
He also suggests that there are no proven positive impacts on the adoption of SOX 
by American corporations. 
With the major corporate scandals of the mid 2000´s involving global 
corporations, corporate governance became an important topic for most countries 
with governments adopting some SOX recommendations 
2.2.1 Motivation for research 
Colombia and Mexico provide interesting contexts for research not only because 
both have had similar developments in corporate governance regulations but also 
because their economic and political environment are more stable when 
compared to other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Peru and 
Venezuela. The similarity in the way that their corporate governance reforms have 
adapted to their growing capital markets gives the author a perfect fit for this 
research. 
2.2.2 Colombia’s evolution on Corporate Governance 
Colombia first included specific Corporate Governance laws in the early 70´s 
through the publication of the Commercial Law “Codigo de comercio” in 1971 
(based on French civil law). Its basic Corporate Governance laws of corporations 
(i.e. not sole properties or partnerships) were focused on both shareholder 
protection of dividends where at least 50% of profits were to be distributed unless 
70% of shareholders represented at shareholders meeting thought differently, and 
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on boards of directors where yearly elections with electoral quotient methodology 
were supposed to be held and with families not being allowed to have majorities 
in boards of non family owned companies. 
In 1995 a second Corporate Governance law was published (Law 222) which 
focused on Directors responsibilities and liabilities (again for all companies not 
only listed ones). It defined directors as Management, Board members and 
whoever had a top management role (this was meant to include pyramid 
ownership corporations present in Colombia). The law created requirements for 
directors such as: 
1.   “Acting within the moral standards of a good business man”. It defined that 
directors were responsible for company’s failure unless proven differently. 
2. Making sure appropriate dividends were not only approved but also 
distributed. 
3. To inform shareholders of possible conflicts of interest 
4. Prohibition from using inside information on their behalf. 
This law complemented the Commercial Law of 1971 but lacked very important 
definitions such as what conflict of interest and inside information really meant. 
Colombia, like most of the Latin American countries began to work on the proper 
implementation of Corporate Governance Mechanisms (as safekeeping 
mechanisms of shareholders interests) looking to promote capital market 
development. Initial efforts were lead by the OECD in the development of the 
White Paper on Corporate Governance for Latin America between 2000 and 2002.  
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The Secretary of Securities in 2001, looking specifically to promote capital market 
development issued Resolution 275 in 2001 in which Corporate Governance codes 
were required for companies looking to receive pension fund investments. This 
new requirement promoted the publication of Corporate Governance codes by 
listed companies (without specification of quality standards) but did not enforce 
“better” governance practices.  
In 2005, following global corporate scandals the new capital markets law was 
issued (law 964 of 2005) which complemented both the Commercial Law of 1971 
and the corporate governance law of 1995. It also eliminated resolution 275. 
The new capital market law contributes to corporate governance in two basic 
ways: 
 Boards of Directors: Number of directors was set between 5 and 10 with 
at least 25% being independent (this was somewhat copied from SOX) 
with management being forbidden from being appointed Chairman of 
the Board. The electoral system became more flexible by offering other 
options beyond electoral quotient as long as the majority of 
shareholders decided on it. Proposals submitted by someone 
representing at least 5% of the company´s shares must be discussed and 
answered by the Board.  
 Information disclosure: Listed companies are required to inform 
whether they apply good corporate governance practices or not. Also 
Management is now required to certify the validity of Financial Reports.   
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As has been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs Colombia´s governing bodies 
have issued three main corporate governance laws in the last forty years with 
major changes in corporate governance mechanisms such as the Board of 
Directors. It is worth saying that even though important changes have been made 
in corporate governance regulations, there are still large differences between 
Colombia and developed countries such as the UK. Table 2 provides a summary of 
the key differences between Corporate Governance between Colombia and the 
UK. 
2.2.3 Mexico´s evolution of corporate governance 
Information on the evolution of corporate governance for Mexico is scarce and few 
documents can be found that could lead to a proper understanding of this process. 
Before 1990, Mexico as other Latin American countries had a policy of import 
substitution that was generated to strengthen up the Mexican industry by 
protecting it from foreign competition. Following this line of thought the Mexican 
government restricted foreign ownership to 49% while controlling many 
companies. 
 
Both Mexico and Colombia have civil law legal environments. As in Colombia, 
Mexico initially issued the Code of Best Corporate Practices in 1999 (immediately 
following the LA White Paper).  The code included more than 50 recommendations 
on Corporate Governance with some of them being board size (between 5 and 20), 
board independence (board should have at least 20% of independent directors) 
and the creation of different committees (auditing, compensation). Compliance 
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with the code was voluntary with companies only being required by the regulating 
agency to inform the level of compliance with the code.  
In 2001 the most important stock market law was amended (LEY DEL MERCADO 
DE VALORES) with no major changes for Corporate Governance with Corporate 
Governance changes only becoming mandatory for all listed companies in 2006 
when the new Stock Market law was issued (LEY DEL MERCADO DE VALORES DE 
2006).  
Mexican law defines that ownership of more than 10% of corporate stock gives 
owners the right to appoint a board director, however since high family ownership 
concentration is common among Mexican listed stocks, boards are usually made up 
of family members. Mexico also allows CEO Duality meaning that the same person 
can be both the CEO and the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Literature on this 
topic has mixed views on whether this creates or destroys value. Mexican law 
differs from Colombian law in this topic since Colombian Law does not allow for 
CEO Duality.  
Also, Mexican law, contrary to international standards only mentions as board 
members responsibilities the hiring and dismissal of company employees. Other 
specific requirements mentioned in the LEY DEL MERCADO DE VALORES are:   
1. Board size must have an upper limit of 21 members. 
2. The percentage of independent directors on a board should be of at least 25%. 
(Article 24) – This should not include company executives or shareholders who 
are active inside the company, creditors, etc. 
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Since most governance reforms were implemented after the                                                                                                                                            
corporate scandals of late 90´s literature on the subject is limited. Sarbanes Oxley 
has been used as the main guideline for ideal governance both in the US and 
globally (most reforms were based on Sarbanes Oxley). Sarbanes Oxley is 
consistent with agency theory principles, putting emphasis on board size and 
independence as vehicles to protect shareholders against value destruction. 
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Table 2 Corporate Governance Differences between Colombia, Mexico and the UK 
Characteristic Colombia Mexico UK 
Laws/ Origin Commercial Law of 1971, CG Law 222 of 1995 and 
Capital Market Law 964 of 2005 
Origin: French Civil Law 
Code of Best 
Corporate Practices 
 
Origin: Latin 
America White 
Paper 
Cadbury Code of 1992 
Origin: Common Law 
 
Capital Market-Listed 
companies 
Less than 100, created 1929 More than 150, 
created 1933 
More than 3000, 
created 1760 
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Ownership 
Concentration 
High High Low 
Shareholder 
protection 
Minority shareholders can write to Board who is 
supposed to answer (Law 964 of 2005) 
They have to claim 
the invalidity of the 
decisions taken by 
the board. 
Any shareholder can 
access board members 
at anytime 
Board Of Directors Size 5-10, 25% independent (Law 964 of 2005) 
 
Legal Rep cannot be chairman of the Board (Law 964 
of 2005) 
Yearly elections no restriction on terms for 
independent 
Board must have an 
upper limit of 21 
members. 
25% of 
independent 
members. 
CEO duality is 
No formal or specific 
restrictions. 
Recommendation of 
having outside 
independent member 
No restriction on 
Chairman of the Board 
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allowed. 
Regulates the 
activities that the 
board members 
must have. 
Recommendation on 
limit of term for 
independent 
Board Committees Auditing (Law 964 of 2005) Auditing Auditing, Nomination 
and Remuneration 
Information 
disclosure 
Certification by Legal Representative of validity of 
Financial Reports and of control systems (Law 964 of 
2005) 
Certification of 
financial reports 
and must comply to 
the corporate 
regulations. 
Certification of financial 
reports and of 
compliance with code 
(reasons for not 
complying with it) 
US Regulations, specifically Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is very similar to Cadbury
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2.2.4 Research on Colombia 
Limited research has been done on Colombia on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership concentration and board 
characteristics and value. Gutierrez, Pombo and Taborda (2008) using stock 
market data found high concentration of ownership in Colombian listed 
companies. Gutierrez and Pombo (2008) using data from 1996-2004 showed that 
such levels of concentration affected value negatively due to tunnelling (asset 
appropriation by a controlling shareholder). They also found that when dispersed 
ownership was present tunnelling decreased due to “contestability”.  
Gutierrez and Pombo´s working paper on corporate governance and valuation 
(2005) uses data from 1998 to 2002 to show that ownership is related to value but 
does not offer a clear explanation on the causes; using a Corporate Governance 
Index as proxy they show that corporate governance practices are positively 
related to value. Further research on corporate governance and value is needed 
since major Corporate Governance reforms were issued in 2005. Their work on 
corporate governance and capital markets (2009) mentions the importance of 
pension funds in capital market development. In this work they do not challenge 
nor support their prior findings but only mention corporate governance impact on 
capital market development. Among their findings they show that, for example, 
minority shareholders have decreased in manufacturing, electrical and financial 
listed companies between 2002 and 2007 with only four companies showing 
participations by minority shareholders of more than 10% (Acerias Paz del Rio – 
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18,89%, Bancolombia – 29,93%, Banco de Bogotá – 20,13% and ISA with 23,43%). 
They also mention that Colombia’s market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
has increased from 3,5% to 59% between 1990 and 2007 with a rate of growth 
only comparable to Peru´s, however Colombia shows the least amount of listed 
companies among the 6 largest Latin American Countries (96 in 2007). They 
believe that some unique characteristics present in Colombia account for that: 
Fiscal regulations being too complex, no unique system for taxation of dividends, 
regulation of pension funds portfolios being too strict (not allowing for 
diversification) and no private equity presence in the capital markets.  
Over the last few years large state owned companies have been privatized and 
listed in the Colombian Stock Exchange bringing a new reality to Colombia’s 
capital markets. Dyck (2001) and Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2004) mention the 
importance of corporate governance practices on successful privatizations. Chong 
and Lopez de Silanes (2004) in their study on privatizations in Mexico found that 
privatization led to improved performance in firms mostly from productivity gains 
due in part to good corporate governance. They believed that good governance 
leads to easier and better access to capital markets meaning a lower cost of capital 
and higher shareholder value.  
As mentioned previously Private pension funds were created in 1993 prompting a 
significant growth in Colombia’s capital market, since their creation they have 
grown exponentially and by law are required to invest part of their portfolios in 
Colombian assets (Social Security reform of 1993). Pension funds are institutional 
investors and their returns are closely monitored by the Finance Control 
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Commission (Superintendencia financiera). Since they manage people’s pension 
money they cannot run the risk of value destruction created by agency problems, 
for this reason they value corporate governance positively. Resolution 275 of 2001 
stated that pension funds were only permitted to invest in companies with 
corporate governance codes with the requirement being changed to having good 
governance practices by Law 964 of 2005.  
It is important to mention that Latin American governments believe in the 
importance of capital market development via the active participation of 
institutional investors such as pension funds. In December 2009 a meeting was 
held in Chile and a White Paper on Strengthening the Role of Institutional 
Investors in Latin American Corporate Governance was presented. This document 
recommends that regarding Board of Directors, Institutional Investors should play 
a more active role in them as in both Chile and Brazil, where pension fund 
managers are required to participate actively on Boards. This document provides 
examples of strong government practices and their effect on capital markets such 
as Brazil “Nuovo Mercado”, a different stock market within the Sao Paolo Stock 
Exchange where the stocks that are traded belong to companies with certified 
good governance practices.  
Aguilera in a chapter of McGee’s book on Corporate Governance in Developing 
Economies (2008) mentions that there is no convergence to the Anglo American 
Model of corporate governance as Latin American countries develop their own 
corporate governance systems. She mentions that all countries in Latin America 
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are usually put erroneously in a single category, when their economic, political 
and social realities are different. 
In her study Aguilera describes the reality of Latin America´s largest 5 countries: 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela (she excludes Mexico due to its 
close connection with the US). 
Among differences that she mentions that some important elements affecting the 
way governance is implemented differ among the above-mentioned countries such 
as: 
 Corruption: Corruption levels vary from a low of 2.3 in CPI (Corruption 
Perception Index) in Venezuela to a high of 7.3 in Chile (this means that Chile is 
the least corrupt country) with Colombia being at 3.9. 
 Financial sector Development: Private Credit as a percentage of GDP varies 
from a low of 11% in Venezuela to a high of 61% in Chile with Colombia being 
at 27% (source Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer 2004) 
 Stock Market Development: Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
varies from as low as 5% in Venezuela, to as high as 120% in Chile with 
Colombia being at 41%. 
  
Aguilera also refers to 2003 data to show there are ownership concentration 
differences among Latin American countries, with Colombia having the lowest 
percentage at 44% of stocks owned by the largest shareholder and Argentina 
having the highest figure at 61%. Regarding Board structure she mentions that 
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Colombia has the lowest average number of directors per board at 5 while Brazil 
has the highest average at 8.5. 
Given the differences mentioned by both the White Paper on Strengthening the 
Role of Institutional Investors in Latin American Corporate Governance (2009) 
and on Aguilera’s work (2008) and given the evolution of Corporate Governance 
laws in Colombia over the last 30 years, research on the relationship between 
Corporate Governance elements such as Ownership structure and Board of 
Directors Characteristics and Value is not only interesting, but valuable for 
academics and regulators by providing evidence of legal reforms and their impact 
on economic stability and growth, and  to investors by providing information that 
can reduce risk. 
2.2.5 Research on Mexico 
Studies on corporate governance for Mexico are very scarce. Amongst these 
studies by LLSV (1999) and Klapper and Love (2003), where authors find that 
Mexico shows weak shareholder protection and high levels of ownership 
concentration. Other authors who focus solely on Mexico find similar results 
(Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2001). Husted and Serrano (2002) in their study on 
Corporate Governance on Mexico support these findings and report that not only 
ownership is concentrated in Mexico but that for example for 95% of the family 
firms listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange the CEO is a family member. Siegel 
(2009) mentions that the lack of governance in Mexican companies has limited 
their access to both external financing and technology. More recent studies on 
corporate governance for Mexico have focused on the impact of governance 
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recommendations and guidelines on value. While Manchuga and Teitel (2009) and 
Price et al (2011) agree on the lack of evidence of a positive impact on value due to 
the implementation of such recommendations, Chong et al (2009) on the other 
hand, provide evidence that when companies in Mexico implemented 
differentiating governance tools effectively, they were able to get lower costs of 
capital and thus increased their value. Research on Mexico`s listed companies 
shows both weak shareholder protection due mainly to a weak legal system, and 
high ownership concentration in founding families as being part of Mexican 
business culture (LLSV, 1999; Klapper and Love, 2003).  
There is no specific research on Corporate Governance laws, board of directors, or 
CEO duality and their relationship with firm value for Mexico 
2.3  Mapping the field 
2.3.1  Overview 
The mapping field presents an adjusted Venn diagram with three elements: 
corporate value, board characteristics and corporate governance reforms. These 
adjustments were made so that it addressed specific and relevant issues of 
research.  
This systematic review, as the diagram shows, will aim to look at documents that 
include either two of the three of identified topics. Research moved from a very 
broad topic to a more focused area. The study is focusing specifically on corporate 
governance reforms, boards characteristics and their relationship with firm value 
for both Mexico and Colombia.  
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Figure 2  Mapping the field 
 
2.3.2  Theoretical framework 
This research uses agency theory and stewardship theories of Corporate 
Governance as the theoretical foundation  
Agency Theory & Stewardship Theory 
Agency theory is based on the conflict of interest between managers (agents) and 
owners (principals). It was first mentioned briefly by Adam Smith in “The wealth 
of Nations” (1776), initially studied by Berle and Means (1932) and later 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who believe that both managers and 
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shareholders are utility maximizers and act accordingly, meaning that if their 
interests are not aligned, then a principal agent problem arises which can 
potentially affect a firm’s performance.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe that “monitoring and bonding costs” need to 
be incurred in order to make sure that the managers act on behalf of shareholders. 
They call these costs agency costs and define them as the sum of the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures (both pecuniary and non 
pecuniary) by the agent and the residual loss (the welfare lost by the principal due 
to the misalignment of interests).  
Managers try to maximize their own personal welfare and that comes via 
dividends if they own company stock and/or via management compensation 
(salary and benefits). With concentrated ownership in the hands of the manager, 
cash flow rights of ownership are not affected by management´s behaviour, 
however with dispersed ownership managers only have limited cash flow rights of 
ownership and might look for special benefits (compensation) through decisions 
that may not create shareholder value. Cash flow rights are one of the important 
sources of the agency conflict (Jensen, 1986). As cash flow rises, agency costs rise 
accordingly since managers will have power by having more resources under their 
control and may be tempted to promote growth beyond optimal size (Jensen, 
2004).  
Since corporate assets are financed by either equity and/or debt, managers use 
debt to lower costs. Acquiring debt also creates agency costs of debt that appear in 
the form of incentive effects, explained as owner/managers making decisions that 
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bring large payoffs with low probability of success since the cost of failure will be 
borne by the creditors) in highly leveraged firms. 
Jensen (2004) based on his initial study and using stock market data defines a new 
agency cost called “the agency costs of overvalued equity”. Since stock markets 
place an important value on growth and short-term results, managers looking to 
succeed are motivated (and eventually paid) to lie and manipulate corporate 
financial reports. This results in an inappropriate valuation of companies. 
La Porta et al. (2000), studied ownership around the world and found that 
ownership is more concentrated in countries outside the US especially in countries 
with low shareholder protection. As investors increase their equity positions they 
are more inclined to look after their investment thus incurring additional agency 
costs. La Porta et al (2000) Lins (2003), Klapper and Love (2005) mention that as 
ownership concentration increases then a new agency problem appears, that of 
misalignment of interest between majority and minority shareholders. 
Stewardship theory proposes a different view. The word steward goes back to 
monarchical times where a person serves and represents the monarchy, and thus 
is not expected to act as independent agent with interests different than the ones 
of the principal. Following this line of thought, managers that act as stewards 
create value just by representing the principals properly. 
The organizational structure that optimizes “steward type” managers is one where 
managers have total authority over the company. CEO duality, a common 
leadership structure found in Mexico is an example of such structure. Agency 
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Theory has a strong argument for no duality while Stewardship Theory supports 
it. 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance has been a major topic of research in corporate finance for 
over 30 years. Multiple definitions of Corporate Governance have been presented 
in previous years, all with the same focus, to give “suppliers of finance to 
corporations an adequate return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Reaz and Hossain (2007) see it as a “practice that deals with the concerns that one 
or more parties involved with organizational decision making may not behave in 
the best interest of the organization and associated parties” while Monks and 
Minnow (1995) present it as a mechanism of power and control. On the other 
hand Cadbury (1992) sees it as a set of relationships between all stakeholders that 
looks to ensure that objectives are set and attained. One of the best definitions is 
provided by Denis and McConnell (2003) as they describe it as a set of 
mechanisms – both institutional and market based- that induce the self interested 
controllers of a company to make decisions that maximize value to its owners, “the 
suppliers of capital” (2003).    
Corporate Governance can be divided into two different sets of mechanisms, 
internal and external ones.   
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2.3.3.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms include board of directors, ownership 
structure and management compensation since they have an impact on the 
principal agent relationship. 
2.3.3.2 Boards of Directors 
Boards of Directors are groups elected by owners that are expected to monitor 
management and look to maximize value to shareholders by defining executive 
compensation, by appointing and dismissing CEO´s and by deciding on dividend 
payment policies. While their theoretical value is accepted (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) their practical value has been questioned severely (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, Denis and McConnell, 2003, Kahna, Kogan and Palepu, 2006, Becht, 
Jenkinson and Myers, 2005). Research on the effectiveness of the Board of 
Directors has concentrated on US companies with conflicting results. Research is 
scarce for emerging economies. 
2.3.3.3 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The most important external corporate governance mechanisms are the legal 
system (La Porta et al, 2000; Becht, Jenkinson and Myer, 2005; Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and the takeover market (Becht, 
Jenkinson and Myer, 2005; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The legal system plays a fundamental role as a mechanism (la Porta et al, 2000) 
since the laws on shareholder protection and their enforcement play a very big 
role in the way managers behave on behalf of shareholders interests. As 
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mentioned before, Klapper and Love (2005), Lins (2003) and LaPorta et al (2000) 
mention that when these laws are either not present or are not enforced 
shareholders look for other mechanisms to protect their interests such as 
ownership concentration. 
When managers fail to maximize value after managing corporations inefficiently in 
a liquid and deep stock market such as the US, corporate value falls well below 
potential value, creating a gap large enough to bring outsiders as potential 
investors. Takeover transactions are mostly done at a premium price creating 
value to original shareholders. Having the threat of a takeover makes managers 
manage companies more efficiently thus aligning their interests with those of the 
shareholders. (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Beck, Jenkinson and Myer, 2005). 
Internationally, Corporate Governance systems differ depending on economic and 
legal environments. For example, there is the Anglo-Saxon system, the Germanic 
system, the Japanese system and the Latin system.  
The Anglo-Saxon system is one where by following common law, legal protection 
of shareholders is stronger. Usually there is only a single board of directors 
composed of internal and external members. Stock markets are more developed 
and liquid thus making the takeover market an important mechanism of control 
(Reaz and Hossain, 2007). 
The Germanic system presents more ownership concentration and more 
involvement by stakeholders (such as employees and banks) other than owners. 
There are two boards, a management board and a supervisory board, making 
board dynamics substantially different than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Stock 
  67 
market liquidity and the presence of a takeover market is less common and 
creditors such as banks play an important monitoring role; in Germanic countries 
banks are allowed to own corporate stock. 
The Latin System has characteristics of both of the above-mentioned systems, 
while legal protection of shareholders is not as strong, board dynamics are more 
closely related to the Anglo-Saxon system. Banks participate in corporate equity 
(Reaz and Hossain, 2007) in Latin- European countries like in the Germanic 
system, however there are legal restrictions for this to happen in Latin-American 
countries such as Colombia. 
The Japanese system is based on the interaction of employees and shareholders 
and these two parties participate in the Board of Directors along with auditors. 
Banks also play an important role as monitors (by being creditors and owners of 
equity). Japan’s stock market is developed and liquid but there is no takeover 
market. 
This review will show that there is no perfect system and that corporate 
governance mechanisms need to be adapted to different environments. Corporate 
Governance research has shown mixed results on the relationship of its different 
mechanisms to corporate value, with scarce research done for emerging markets. 
This research, as mentioned before, will focus on the relationship between the 
Board of Directors, governance laws, CEO duality, family ownership and their 
relationship to value for Colombia and Mexico 
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2.3.4 Review Objectives 
Objectives & review questions 
The main objective of this systematic review is to try to understand what impact 
do Corporate Governance mechanisms have on corporate value. This review of 
literature provides the author with the tools to empirically test whether these 
relationships exist in emerging markets such as Colombia and Mexico. The key 
research question is: how are Corporate Governance reforms and Board of 
Directors size and composition related to corporate value in Colombia and Mexico. 
It is important to properly look at a broader context. 
Table 3 questions for systematic review 
Questions identified for literature examination 
Q1: Are governance reforms related to corporate value? 
Q2: Are Board of Directors characteristics such as size and composition 
(independence of board and CEO duality) related to corporate value? 
 
2.4   Methodology 
2.4.1 Overview 
In this section the author will summarize the methodology used during the 
Systematic Review process. The figure below presents the steps taken in the 
process.  
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Figure 3 Systematic review process  
 
2.4.2  Consultation Panel 
The author chose the systematic review consultation panel after finishing the 
scoping study and presented in November 2008 an initial draft for the systematic 
review. During 2009 the author added a few experts to the consultation panel. The 
author invited Augusto Acosta, former CEO of The Colombian Stock Exchange and 
former President of the Securities Exchange and Banking Regulator 
(Superintendencia Financiera) and Lorenzo Preve, Finance Professor at IAE 
Business School. It is important to mention that the Systematic Review panel has 
not changed and that the author only used the consultation panel for advice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Include Include Data extraction
Exclude Exclude
Databases
Other sources
Search Selection Assessment Analysis
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Table 4 Review Consultation  panel 
Person Organization 
Role in review and assistance 
provided 
Professor Sunil 
Poshakwale 
Cranfield University 
Supervisor: ongoing support and main 
reviewer of my work 
Dr. Vineet 
Agarwal 
Cranfield University 
Supervisory panel member:  topic 
expert 
Professor 
Andrew Burke 
Cranfield University 
Supervisory panel member:  research 
expert 
Professor 
Lorenzo Preve 
IAE Business School Advisor: Research and topic expert 
Mr. Augusto 
Acosta 
Murano Consulting 
Industry advisor:  Topic expert for Latin 
America and Colombia 
 
2.4.3  Search Strategy 
2.4.3.1 Information Sources 
The author made an initial literature search for the Scoping Study for framing the 
subject but felt that it was not rigorous enough to go into the necessary detail 
needed for the review. The main sources of literature were electronic databases, 
references given from the review panel, cross-referencing from fundamental 
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papers and through the identification of key authors. The author used tool bars 
such as Google Scholar as a complementary element of the review. These lead to 
search in the following sources of literature: 
1. Business and Economics Databases: The author used 3 main databases, Ebsco, 
Proquest and Science Direct (Google Scholar was helpful in finding just titles). 
Both Ebsco and Proquest are the most popular and complete databases but 
sometimes do not carry specific Journals (a few times the author had to look 
directly into SSRN). Science Direct on the other hand is not as complete but 
carries both appropriate journals (for the research) and has a better cross-
referencing engine. The author used search strings in all three databases and 
got about 80% of all the literature from them 
2. Policy Papers by either Governing Bodies and/or Multilateral Entities: Through 
the process and guidance of the Systematic review panel meeting, the author 
decided to look at sources other than the main academic databases and with 
the recommendation of the panel looked at both the Federal Reserve, the 
Interamerican Development Bank, the World Bank and the Colombian 
Chamber of Commerce and Finance Commission for literature finding plenty of 
different literature. Both the World Bank and the Interamerican Development 
Bank have done research on Corporate Governance and value. A few very 
useful papers on Colombia were added to these databases in the last two 
months of the systematic review. 
3. Conference and University working papers: Also with the recommendation of 
the panel the author looked for working papers and conference papers and 
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found that over the years Darden Business School has conducted a conference 
on International Finance having discussed (and still discussing) the 
relationship between corporate finance and corporate governance 
4. Cross-referencing: As an alternative tool the author also looked at the table of 
references of the papers that were cited the most in the electronic databases 
and found a good number of papers (specifically unpublished working papers) 
not cited in the databases. 
2.4.3.2 Keywords & search strings 
For electronic databases the author used strings that went from the specific to 
general topic (for example from large shareholders and value…. To board of 
directors and value…to corporate governance and value) since sometimes topics 
are put with different names in academic research.  See Table 5 for keywords and 
Table 6 for strings and results. The author also followed some recommendation of 
the panel for specific papers of a specific author outside of the strings used in the 
search. 
For working papers, policy papers and conference papers the author started the 
opposite way looking at general topics (Corporate governance) and then looking 
at more specific ones (board of directors) due to availability. When search strings 
were not usable/available the author looked at the complete databa
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Table 5 Keywords for search 
Topic Key Words / Phrases 
Corporate Governance Corporate Governance Governance 
 
Reforms Shareholder Protection 
 
Entrenchment 
 Emerging Markets Emerging Countries Developing countries 
 
Emerging Markets Developing economies 
 
Emerging economies 
 Latin America Latin America Mexico/Mexican 
 
Colombia / Colombian 
 Boards of Directors Characteristics Board Size Inside Directors or Monitors 
 
Board Composition Outside Monitors 
 
Board Structure Corporate Boards 
 
Board Independence CEO Duality 
 
Ownership structure Family Ownership 
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Table 6 Search strings 
String Pro Quest EBSCO Elsevier 
Corporate gov* AND Reforms AND emerging markets AND (Value OR Performance) 52 26 227 
Corporate gov* AND (Colombia OR Mexico) AND (Value OR Performance) 140 41 300 
Board of directors* AND Value 383 125 352 
Board of directors* AND Value AND (Latin America or Emerg*) 44 12 113 
Board size AND Value AND Corporate Gov* 342 115 233 
Board Comp* AND Board Indep* AND Value 
 
49 19 44 
Latin Am* And Ownersh* AND Family Own*AND (Value OR Performance) 17 2 167 
Board of* AND CEO dua* AND Performance 33 12 36 
Total 1060 352 1472 
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2.4.4 Selection Criteria  
The strategy used of going from the general to the specific yielded a large number 
of hits as seen in Table 7 The following criteria were used to reduce the number of 
applicable research literature:  
Table 7 Selection criteria for titles & abstracts   
Inclusion / exclusion criteria Rationale 
1. Only studies using Agency 
Theory and Stewardship 
Theory as the theoretical 
foundation 
Consistency with the focus of my 
research topic and theoretical 
foundation 
2. Studies from top rated journals 
(Cranfield’s rating – only 
journals with a 3 or more were 
taken into account) 
Body of literature is vast and top rated 
journals require academic rigor 
3. Transition economies and 
special situations 
Outside the focus of the research 
4. Methodology and empirical 
data 
Interested in top academic theory and 
clarity of empirical data used.   
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The Cranfield Journal list of selected journals/papers proved to be an efficient tool 
to select and filter the database of the papers. This list provides a quality appraisal 
from 1-4 that changes from national publication, internationally recognised, 
internationally excellent and world leading. This list allowed the author to asses 
the relevance of each paper by mainly choosing the ones in the top two ranks. 
The initial search results based on the search strings used produced 2884 hits 
across the three databases used. This large number of articles included a large 
amount of duplications (2296) so the total number of articles collected for the title 
abstract review was reduced to 588. This title and abstract review removed 476 
mostly because they were from journals with a rating lower than 3 (Cranfields 
rating) (408) or because they included transition economies (39). 
Table 7a Search Results   
Search Iterations No 
Initial Database results (Proquest 1060, EBSCO 352, Elsevier 1472) 2884 
Duplications  (2296) 
Subtotal 588 
Not using Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory (29) 
Not in Cranfield´s Top rated journals (408) 
Transition economies (39) 
FINAL NUMBER REVIEWED 112 
  77 
The end result after eliminating duplicates led to 112 papers for full text revision. 
Evaluation criteria for full text papers: 
Conceptual or theoretical papers must contain one or more of the following: 
 Hypotheses regarding key attributes or any relationship to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  
  Clear Presentation of a theory or a proposed model related to the 
relationship between corporate governance and value. 
Empirical papers must contain at least one or more of the following: 
 Well-defined methodology and data sample relevant for research. 
 Discussion and analysis of corporate governing mechanisms and their 
relevance 
 A Clear contribution to knowledge. 
2.4.5  Quality Appraisal 
To be able to really perform a quality appraisal the author needed to develop a few 
guidelines that are mentioned in table 8 (Holmes, 2006) 
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Table 8 Quality assessment criteria 
Theory 
1. Are papers based on a specific, clearly defined theoretical 
foundation? 
2. Are findings related to theory? 
Methods 
1. Is the methodology used clearly explained? 
2. Is explanation given for any sampling and data collection? 
3. Are limitations in the methodology described? 
Analysis & 
Interpretation 
1. Is the analysis clearly described and thoroughly explained? 
2. Is the relationship between analysis and interpretation 
explained clearly? 
Coherence 
1. Is there a link between the theory and the analysis?  
2. Are they explained clearly? 
3. Are the conclusions related to the initial research 
question? 
 
 
The author also classified according to a 0-2 scale each of the papers in four 
categories. The following table presents the categories and the descriptive criteria 
of each. 
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Table 9 Grading System 
Concept Mediocre (0) Good (1) Excellent (2) 
Theory No clear theoretical foundation and no 
relationship between findings and 
theory 
Either clear theoretical foundation or 
clear relationship between findings and 
theory 
Clear theoretical foundation and clear 
relationship between findings and 
theory 
Methods No clear description of methods, data 
collection and limitations 
 
 
 
Clear description of methods and data 
collection but no description of 
limitations 
Clear description of methods data 
collection and description of limitations 
Analysis and Interpretation No clear explanations of analysis and 
findings  
Analysis clearly described but no 
relationship between analysis and 
interpretation 
Clear analysis and clear relationship 
between analysis and interpretation 
Coherence No clear relationship between 
conclusion and research question 
Clear relationship between conclusion 
and research question but no clear 
relationship between theory and 
analysis 
Clear relationship between conclusion 
and research question and clear 
relationship between theory and 
analysis 
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Papers with a total grade of less than 3 or with two 0´s were not included.  
2.4.6    Results and Statistics 
After conducting the initial search and after doing both the title and abstract 
appraisal and the full paper appraisal on 112 papers the following were the results 
Table 10 Summary of paper review process 
Summary statistics on papers reviewed No 
Database/Internet search (After title & Abstract evaluation 112 
TOTAL REVIEWED 112 
Excluded due to quality concerns 4 
Did not meet inclusion criteria 1 
Other Factors 2 
TOTAL EXCLUDED 7 
FINAL NUMBER REVIEWED 105 
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2.4.7  Data Extraction 
The resulting papers included in the review were recorded in both Refworks and 
in Excel.  Data was extracted to Refworks using their platform while it was 
exported into excel using the framework shown in table 11 below. 
Table 11 Data extraction categories 
Citation 
information 
1. Author  
2. Paper name 
3. Journal  
4. Year of publication 
Descriptive 
information 
4. Country 
5. Main topic discussed (Corporate governance, Board of 
Directors or both)  
Methodological 
information 
6. Type of study  (Theoretical or empirical) 
7. Data used 
8. Methodology 
Thematic 
information 
9. Main Findings 
10. Comments (Basic Quality appraisal) 
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2.5 Descriptive statistics 
2.5.1  Overview 
In this section a descriptive analysis of the main findings of the systematic review 
are presented. This analysis is done by topic, date, location and type. 
2.5.2  Topic 
The focus of this systematic review was on literature from two main topics  (that 
most of the times are interrelated) and their relationship to firm value and 
performance: corporate governance, and Board of Directors Characteristics.  The 
results are presented in the following table:   
Table 12 Papers by topic 
  Corporate Governance or board characteristics 
Corporate 
Governance 
22 
B ards 
Characteristics 
63 
Both 20 
 
  Related to value? 
YES 88 
NO 17 
 
Due to the fact that the main topics of this systematic review are interrelated a 
large number of papers appeared in the “papers with multiple topics”.  
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2.5.3  Papers by year of publication (date) 
In the initial search no restrictions were used as for date of publication, since the 
paper used as the theoretical foundation was published in 1976 all papers used 
were published after that initial date. Figure 4 shows this distribution graphically. 
Figure 4 Distribution by year of publication  
 
2.5.4  Type of study (theoretical –literature review- empirical) 
Most of the literature available in this topic is empirical with the theoretical 
foundation literature totally theoretical. A few theoretical papers were included 
due to the clarity of their conclusions and models. 
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Table 13  Papers by type 
  Theoretical or empirical? 
Theoretical 10 
Literature review 13 
Empirical 82 
2.5.5 Location  
Since the research will be focused on corporate governance in a specific emerging 
market such as Colombia and Mexico a distribution by Region/country was 
necessary to determine gaps in literature (different applicability for different 
countries). The following table shows the regions or countries that had more than 
one paper. As can be seen in the following table most of the literature is based in 
the US context. 
Figure 5 Papers by location 
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2.6 Findings and discussion 
This section contains a summary of the findings and main discussions that the 
literature presents in trying to answer the review questions. 
2.6.1  Key themes by topic 
2.6.1.1 Corporate Governance Reforms and Firm value 
The results from the existing studies are scarce. On emerging markets Price et al 
(2001) found that for Mexico it does not exist any link between this two variables. 
The author states that even though the regulations implemented were effective in 
changing practices on Mexican companies there appears to be no significant 
change on their value. 
These results are validated by authors such as Klapper and Love (2003) and LLSV 
(2000), who argue that is Mexico’s reality (high ownership concentration, lack of 
protection and weak minority shareholder protection) the key factor for this non-
relationship. 
Other authors such as Linck et al (2005) Wintoki (2007) and Basu and Dimitrov 
(2005) did similar studies for Sabarnes-Oxley and found similar results. 
2.6.1.2 Are Boards of Directors Characteristics such as size and composition 
related to corporate value?  
Boards of Directors play a very important role in corporate governance; they 
represent shareholders in their quest for wealth maximization. Theory says that 
they should play an important role in monitoring management. Research and 
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evidence provide mixed results, mainly because there is no unique rule of thumb 
for Board of Directors role in corporate life. The two more studied characteristics 
of Board of Directors are size and composition, the evidence on both their 
relationships with firm value is also mixed.  
2.6.1.3 Board Size 
Yermack (1996) mentions that as Board size increases value is destroyed due to 
slower decision making. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) provide supporting evidence for 
Singapore and Malaysia. Coles et al (2008) challenge this view and mention that 
both very small and very large boards have a positive influence on value due to the 
complexity of businesses. Boone et al (2008) reports that size is not a driver of 
value but a function of size and that as firm size increases so does its board. This 
can be explained by the fact that as firms grow they usually diversify and require 
more support not only for monitoring but also for advising (a new role of Boards 
not presented in theoretical foundation papers). Raheja (2005) presents a 
theoretical model that concludes that there is no optimal size since business 
complexity and firm size differ among companies. This argument challenges 
Sarbanes-Oxley´s recommendation (and Colombian 2005 law on Corporate 
Governance) on an ideal board size for corporations (Wintoki, 2007) 
2.6.1.4 Board Composition 
Literature on Board Composition (Characteristics) is more plentiful than literature 
on size. There is mixed evidence on board composition and its positive influence 
on firm value. Sarbanes-Oxley, along with NYSE recommends an ideal board 
composition including an increasing number of outsiders. The logic behind this 
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argument is based upon the hypothesis that outsiders provide better monitoring 
of management (thus decreasing agency costs) because they are independent. 
While this may be true it is also true that companies sometimes need more advice, 
and insiders tend to know more about the business and can provide better insight 
to the Board. The benefits of this support can offset the agency cost reductions 
that outside directors may provide. This contradicts SOX recommendations 
(Wintoki, 2007).  
Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and Weisenbach (2001) and Baghat and 
Black (1998) suggest that Board Structure does not show a positive relationship 
with performance (value), Colombo and Baglioni (2008) provide evidence from 
Italy on a positive relationship contradicting prior studies. 
As with Board size it is equally accepted that there is no ideal Board composition. 
Board structure should be based on corporate reality, especially on the company’s 
priority between advice (more insiders) and monitoring (more outsiders) (Harris 
and Ravis, 2005; Lehn et al, 2004; Link et al., 2008; Denis and Sarin, 1999). Thus a 
Board make-up should be based on the quantification of the benefits of advice 
versus the agency costs of not monitoring. Reality comes in the fact that this 
quantification is a very difficult one opening up great opportunities for research. 
 A few studies (Dahya et al, 2006) report that Board of Directors are related to 
ownership structures providing further academic evidence regarding the 
impossibility of a standard size or composition of corporate boards. These studies 
present an important issue to be taken into account, which is the possible co-
  88 
linearity between ownership structure and Board of Directors size and 
composition.  
No literature was found on Board of Directors composition in Latin America. Both 
the lack of formal Board size and composition studies found, and the evidence that 
there is no uniform or standard Board composition support the rationale for 
conducting research on Corporate Governance in Colombia or Mexico. 
2.6.1.5 Family Ownership 
Family ownership and its effect on corporate performance/value have been 
extensively researched mostly for developed economies with little research for 
Latin America. Studies have been conducted showing that most companies in most 
economies are family owned such as the US, the UK, Continental Europe and 
Emerging markets (La Porta et al, 1999, Klapper and Love, 2004, Anderson and 
Reeb, 2002, Barontini and Caprio, 2006) with conflicting evidence on the 
relationship between this major shareholder and value creation. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) use S&P 500 data from 1992-1999 to find that Family firms have a 
higher Tobin’s Q and while McConaughy et al (2001) use data from Business week 
CEO 1000 and find that family firms outperform non family firms in terms of value, 
capital structure and efficiency. In another study using Spanish data, Gallo and 
Tapies (2000) find that non-family firms perform better while Barontini and 
Caprio (2006) using Continental Europe data, find no statistical difference 
between family and non-family firms in terms of value. Villalonga and Amit (2004) 
using data from 1994-2000 (fortune 500) found that second generation family 
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business leaders destroy firm value. These findings give rise to questions such as 
what is the impact on firm value when the founder is still active in management.  
2.7 Synthesis  
The Literature review presents some interesting findings in the context of Agency 
Theory. 
As long as there are misalignments in personal interests between owners and 
managers agency problems will appear since managers tend to act in their own 
interests, and will probably make decisions that affect corporate value. Various 
vehicles (which encompass costs called agency costs) for mitigating this “agency 
problem” have been implemented over the years with mixed results. Two of these 
most commonly used vehicles are ownership structure and Board of Directors.  
Family ownership and institutional investor ownership are two of the most 
common ownership concentration types with different effects on value. Literature 
and research show that family ownership can either create alignment between 
management and ownership, thus creating value or entrenchment and tunnelling 
thus destroying value depending mostly on which generation controls the 
company. Again literature shows mixed results. 
Boards of Directors are supposed to play an advising and/or a monitoring role of 
management thus creating value to shareholders. Two of its characteristics i.e. size 
and composition have been widely researched with mixed results on their 
relationship with corporate value. While smaller boards are supposed to make 
decision-making easier and faster (Yermack, 1996) thus creating value, other 
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studies show no statistical relationship between size and value (Baghat and Black, 
2003). Regarding Board compositions relationship to value results are also mixed; 
companies that focus on R&D tend to create value by having more insiders while 
other companies that need more monitoring tend to have more outsiders 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1998, 2001). 
Evidence and research in Latin America and more specifically in Colombia and 
Mexico is very scarce.  
2.8 Conclusions 
The research papers in the literature review have been questioned in-depth to 
enable the development of the framework outlined in section six. Board 
characteristics in emerging markets are not widely studied by literature and with 
capital moving freely around the globe these corporate governance mechanisms 
become very important for foreign investors.  
As seen in the literature corporate governance works differently in emerging 
markets where many governments have adopted recommendations such as some 
from the Sarbanes-Oxley act from developed countries without taking into account 
their applicability to local environments. Doing research on corporate governance 
and firm value for a country such as Colombia will help regulators, investors and 
managers in their quest for stable and efficient economic growth. 
Discussed here are the limitations of the literature review and an outline of 
subsequent empirical research.  
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2.8.1  Limitations  
This literature review´s main limitation is the focus on only a few mechanisms of 
Corporate Governance such as board size and composition. 
2.8.2  Further research – Next Steps 
As found in this literature review, literature on corporate governance in Latin 
America is very scarce and evidence of corporate governance mechanisms and 
their relationship to value in the Colombian or Mexican context is almost non-
existent. Further research is necessary to fill this information gap 
The thesis comprises two empirical projects, first on the relationship between 
Board characteristics and Corporate Governance laws with firm value for Colombia 
and second which examines the relationship between CEO duality and firm value 
for Mexico. Both projects will use information from databases (from both the 
Colombian Stock Exchange and Mexican Stock Exchange and Worldscope) from a 
defined period, specifically the periods before and after the publication of the 
Corporate Governance law in Colombia (2005) and Mexico (2006). 
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3 Board Characteristics and firm value: Evidence from Colombia 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been widely studied in literature as a mechanism to 
address the agency problem. The corporate failures of the late 90´s and early 00´s 
questioned the effectiveness of existing corporate governance systems and 
structures as vehicles for monitoring management. Scandals such as Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmalat showed the inadequacies of the current Corporate 
Governance system and since then new Corporate Governance measures have 
been developed and implemented. The main objective of these initiatives has been 
to develop strong principles for corporate governance that focus on transparency 
and proper corporate management. One such initiative was the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, which was issued in 1999. This was later adopted in 2003 
by Corporate Governance institutions in Latin American countries as a model for 
the development of the White Paper for Corporate Governance for Latin America.  
Colombia, one of Latin America`s more stable economies, can be regarded as being 
closely related to the continental European model of corporate governance. 
However as most Latin American countries, it presents significant differences 
when compared with Europe i.e. smaller capital markets (La Porta et al, 1999), 
weaker protection of shareholders due to a weaker legal system (Klapper and 
Love, 2003, La Porta et al, 1999), and higher ownership concentration (Gutierrez 
et al, 2006, Gutierrez and Pombo, 2008).  
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Since 2003 the Colombian Association of Chambers of Commerce “Confecamaras”, 
the Colombian Stock Exchange “BVC” and the Securities and Banking Commission 
“Superfinanciera” have taken the role of leaders for corporate governance 
development in Colombia. Several documents and laws on this topic have been 
issued and/or enforced over the last decade with the White Book of Corporate 
Governance (“Libro Blanco de Gobierno Corporativo”) and Law 964 of 2005 being 
the most prominent ones. Their main focus has been on improving corporate 
governance practices because it is believed that better governance practices 
provide better shareholder protection, thus decreasing cost of capital and 
providing access to external funding which in turn should propel economic 
development (Chong, 2006). 
The board of directors and its effectiveness as a governance mechanism is one of 
the most widely studied topics in corporate governance literature. Research has 
focused on board characteristics such as size, composition, diversity, CEO duality 
and frequency of meetings and their relationship to firm value and/or 
performance, with size and composition being the aspects most studied. 
Literature presents contradicting arguments on the relationship between board 
characteristics such as board size and composition and firm value. Board size plays 
an important role in corporate monitoring, while Jensen (1976), Yermack (1996) 
and Eisenberg et al (1998) and Mak and Kusnadi (2005) argue that as board size 
increases it becomes less efficient due to slower decision-making. Others such as 
Wintoki (2005) and Coles et al (2008) mention that size is not related to firm value 
by arguing that size is dependent on each individual firm’s reality (need of advising 
or monitoring, size, age, etc.) 
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On board composition, agency theory literature proposes a larger percentage of 
independent members since it leads to greater board independence and better 
monitoring. Literature again presents conflicting evidence, Coles et al (2008) 
findings contradict this view by reporting that a larger percentage of inside 
members leads to better business knowledge and thus to better advising, therefore 
leading to higher firm value. Klapper and Love (2003) and LLSV (2001) argue that 
such conflicting evidence on board size and composition and their relationship 
with firm value can be attributed to either each firm’s reality and/or 
legal/macroeconomic environment. 
Governance reforms, most of them based on Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have been 
published and implemented globally over the last decade. There is very little 
empirical evidence on Sarbanes-Oxley’s effectiveness or its impact on firm value 
(positive results via better shareholder protection) (Wintoki, 2005; Basu and 
Dimitrov, 2010).  
Literature on corporate governance for Colombia is scarce. There is research only 
on ownership concentration (Gutierrez and Pombo, 2008) and Governance Codes 
and Surveys (Klapper and Love, 2003; La Porta et al, 1998; Lopes de Silanes and 
Chong, 2005) with no empirical research on board size and composition.  
As mentioned before, research is limited on both governance reforms and their 
impact on value and corporate governance in Colombia. Sarbanes-Oxley, in its 
quest to improve governance among companies set certain requirements on 
governance vehicles such as the board of directors. These requirements were 
followed and sometimes copied by governing bodies in different countries. The 
Colombian securities commission (Superintendencia Financiera) issued the 
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Governance Law (Ley 964) of 2005 in which requirements were set on both board 
size and composition. The expected results of this law were improvement in 
governance (shareholder protection), which would help foreign investment to 
increase thus prompting economic development. This paper adds to literature by 
providing evidence of the impact of governance reforms (based on Sarbanes Oxley) 
on firm value with data from Colombia. It also provides evidence of the 
relationship between board attributes such as size and composition and firm value 
for an emerging market such as Colombia. This study is valuable for regulators in 
their quest to assess the impact of governance laws; it is also valuable for investors 
(both foreign and local) in assessing risk for equity investments in Colombia. 
The author examined the relationship between Board attributes such as Board size 
and composition with firm value (measured using Tobins Q) for Colombia. The 
author used data for listed companies for the 2001-2013 periods since it included 
observations from periods before and after the governance law of 2005 thus 
allowing assessment of the impact of the governance law on firm value. Empirical 
results for Colombia show no relationship between board attributes and firm 
value, which among other reasons can be explained by its relatively smaller and 
illiquid capital market, weak shareholder protection laws and presence of family 
firms among those observed. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of published 
literature, Section 3 explains the hypotheses, Section 4 describes the data and 
statistics, results are reported in Section 5 and section 6 presents conclusions, 
explains research limitations and identifies opportunities for further research. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Colombia´s Stock Market Evolution 
Colombia´s first stock exchange was established in Bogota in 1929. Two other 
regional exchanges were established in 1963 (Medellin) and in 1981 (Cali). These 
exchanges provided some liquidity to regional companies and investment 
opportunities to local investors. A corporate scandal in 1983 that involved 
Colombia´s biggest business group harmed the credibility of stock markets 
decreasing the number of listed companies from nearly 180 to less than 100 
during that decade. A closed, protectionist economic environment was in place 
between the beginning of the 20th century and 1991 when imports and flow of 
foreign currencies were strictly controlled. 
Colombia changed its economy from a closed protectionist system to an open 
economy in 1991. This gave domestic investors the ability to invest internationally 
and foreigner’s access to Colombian markets.  
In 2001 all three stock exchanges merged together and formed the Colombian 
Stock Exchange (BVC). Since then the number of listed companies has remained 
stable at close to 100 but market capitalization and liquidity has increased 
substantially. Market capitalization is currently close to 300 million USD with 
about one third of all listed stocks considered as liquid stocks. 
When compared to other Latin American stock markets, Colombia has shown 
promising results, its market size ranks behind only Brazil, Mexico and Chile. 
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Unfortunately, Colombia like most other Latin American countries shows low 
levels of capital market development (measured as market capitalization as a % of 
GDP), which has affected economic development. Klapper and Love (2003), LLSV 
(1999) and Lopez de Silanes (2003) agree that the main reason for low levels of 
capital market development in Latin America is due to its weak legal environment 
where shareholder rights are not well protected. 
3.2.2 Colombia´s Corporate Governance Evolution 
The origins of corporate governance in Colombia can be traced to the legal code of 
commerce published in 1971. This legal code was based on roman civil law and 
established the first formal principles of shareholder protection in Colombia. Its 
two most important articles were on board of directors and dividend distribution.  
Regarding the board of directors this code required that boards were elected using 
an electoral quotient system, meaning that cash flow rights (% ownership) were 
proportional to board members. This definition took away the possibility of 
majority shareholders naming the entire board of directors. This code also dealt 
with dividend distribution requiring that at least 70% ownership had to agree for 
100% of profits to be reinvested. 
A second Corporate Governance law was introduced in 1995 (Law 222), which 
dealt primarily with the fiduciary responsibility of corporate directors. It 
confirmed that directors were legally responsible in cases of shareholder wealth 
destruction as a result of negligence and fraud. It also set a limit on board 
memberships in Colombia to five. 
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In 2001 a third Corporate Governance law was issued, being the first one 
specifically focused on listed companies. It required that for companies to be listed 
in the Colombian Stock Exchange they were required to show they had adopted 
governance codes (this law was abolished with Law 964 of 2005). 
Following the large corporate global scandals and also following the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, a fourth Corporate Governance law was issued and adopted in 
2005 (Law 964). It was written specifically for listed companies and defined the 
board of director’s size and composition among other recommendations. 
Since 2003 all Latin American governments have met to discuss corporate 
governance issues, published white papers on it and most of them issued and 
implemented governance laws. Evidence of the positive impact of these white 
papers and subsequent laws on corporate governance in these countries is almost 
non-existent.  
It is important to report that all Latin American countries share civil law legal 
systems, show high levels of ownership concentration, small capital markets, weak 
legal protection for shareholders and deficient judiciary systems (Aguilera, 2008; 
Klapper and Love, 2003; La Porta et al, 1998).   
As for research on Corporate Governance for Colombia, Gutierrez et al (2008) and 
Gutierrez and Pombo (2008) both show a high ownership concentration and a 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value for Colombia by 
using data from 1996 to 2004. However there is no evidence of the impact of 
Colombia´s Law 964 of 2005 on firm value.  
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3.2.3 Board Size and Value 
Literature on the relationship between board size and firm value offers mixed 
findings.  Jensen (1983) believes that as board size increases decision-making 
becomes slower and with free-riding problems, it becomes less efficient leading to 
lower corporate value. Yermack (1998), Eisenberg et al (1998), Mak and Kusnadi 
(2005), De Andres et al (2005), Gill and Marthur (2011), Ujunwa (2012) and 
Kumar and Singh (2013) provide evidence of such argument and find that smaller 
boards are related to higher firm value. Jakling and Johl (2009) provide 
contradicting evidence while studying Indian top companies 
On the other hand Coles et al (2007) provide evidence that both very large and 
very small board sizes affect value positively, he believes that this happens due to 
business complexity. Raheja (2005) supports Coles et al (2007) by suggesting that 
there is no optimal board size, since board size tends to depend on either advising 
or monitoring needs and this changes from company to company. 
Other researchers such as Lehn et al (2009) in their research of 88 US companies 
between 1935 and 2000 found no significant relationship between size and value; 
Boone et al (2007) found a positive relationship between board size and corporate 
size but found no relationship between board size and firm value. 
As mentioned before research in markets other than the US or the UK is very 
scarce, however some researchers have studied this topic with results showing no 
relationship between board size and value. Bonn (2004) found no relationship 
between board size and value for Australia while Di Pietra (2008) had similar 
findings for Italy.  
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3.2.4 Board Composition and Value 
Literature on board composition and its relationship to firm value is mostly 
focused on board independence, which is measured as the percentage of 
independent members. Very limited evidence comes from outside the US and UK, 
especially from emerging economies. 
Sarbanes-Oxley recommends a larger number of independent members so that 
value can be optimized through better monitoring done by the board. This is 
supported by the belief that independent directors are less prone to be entrenched 
or allied with managers, enabling them to perform better monitoring and even 
better advising (Dalton et al, 1999 Jackling and Johl, 2009 and Giraldez and 
Hurtado, 2014).  
Empirical evidence reported by Weisbach (1988) Brickley et al (1994) and Byrd 
and Hickman (1992) provide support by showing that under special circumstances 
boards with a higher proportion of independent members add value to 
shareholders. 
Coles et al (2007) contradict this argument by mentioning that complex companies 
such as ones with R&D issues need more advising than monitoring and therefore 
value is created when a larger number of insiders (who provide advice) are 
present in boards. 
Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and Weisenbach (2001) and Baghat and 
Black (1998) provide evidence on the lack of a positive relationship between board 
independence and value. 
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Another line of thought in the literature suggests that there is no single ideal board 
composition. Researchers argue that composition should be based on corporate 
reality and the internal need for advising and monitoring should determine the 
need for independent members. Harris and Ravis (2005), Lehn et al, (2009) and 
Denis and Sarin (1999) support this hypothesis. If such findings are believed to be 
accurate then board composition decisions should be made on both the benefits of 
advising and the costs of monitoring.  
As for evidence from a more international context, Bonn (2004) Jackling and Johl 
(2009) and Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) presents evidence on the positive 
relationship between the percentage of independent directors and value for 
Australia, India and Spain respectively 
3.2.5 Corporate Governance Reforms and Value 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was published in 2002 as a result of the corporate scandals of 
the beginning of the 2000´s with an aim to ensure better shareholder protection. 
Large exchanges such as NYSE and LSE made corporate governance 
recommendations as listing requirements. While NYSE used mainly SOX, LSE took 
recommendations from the Cadbury Report. 
Literature on the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on governance and value is still scarce 
with most of the research conducted on board dynamics such as trends in board 
size and board composition. Findings show that boards are getting more diverse 
and more independent but presents no compelling evidence with regard to their 
resulting impact on firm value (Linck et al, 2005; Wintoki, 2007; Basu and 
Dimitrov, 2005).  
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Literature is almost non-existent regarding the impact of corporate governance 
laws on firm value in emerging markets such as Colombia. 
3.2.6 Family Ownership and value 
Research concerning the effects that family ownership has on value has been 
growing in the last decade. The studies are mainly on developed markets such as 
the UK or US but other examples can be found. 
Dyer (2006) found that the effects of family ownership are negative on firm´s value 
showing that family managers are hard to monitor and control. This argument is 
supported by Gallo, Tapias and Cappuyins (2000), Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and 
Gutierrez (2001), Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) and Hilburt-Davies and Dyer 
(2003) but not all come to the same conclusion. While Faccio, Lang and Young 
(2001) and Hilburt-Davies (2003) argue that the negative relationship between 
family ownership and firm value is obtained when a second generation and not the 
CEO founder takes control of the firm. Other authors such as Schulze, Lubatkin and 
Dino (2003) and Matias Gama and Menses Galvao (2010) find that major 
shareholders (families) are prone to take advantage and expropriate wealth from 
minor shareholders creating a new agency problem that will lead to a decrease in 
firm value.  
On the other hand Anderson and Reeb (2003) find the opposite relationship and 
argue that the similarity between the agent and the principal in a family owned 
company reduces the agency problem through lower monitoring costs. Authors 
such as Beehr, Drexler and Faulkner (1997), Daily and Dollinger (1992), 
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McConaugy, Matthews and Fialko (2001) support this argument evidence from 
different countries. 
Colombian listed companies do not present a high family ownership concentration. 
Hypothesis Development 
3.2.7 Hypothesis No 1 - Board Size 
As mentioned before, empirical evidence provides mixed results on the 
relationship between board size and firm value. Larger boards (determined by the 
greater amount of members) tend to have slower decision-making, which affects 
value negatively (Jensen, 1983). Yermack (1996),  Mak and Kusnadi (2005),  De 
Andres et al (2005), Gill and Marthur (2011), Ujunwa (2012) and Kumar and Singh 
(2013)  support Jensen (1983) by reporting that smaller boards have lower 
monitoring costs and show faster decision-making. They present evidence of a 
positive relationship between smaller boards and firm value by using US, 
Malaysian, OECD Countries, Canadian manufacturing firms, Nigerian and Indian 
evidence respectively. On the other hand, Coles et al (2007) report that both very 
small and very large boards impact value positively due to different corporate 
business realities. Raheja (2005) supports Coles et al (2007) by stating that there 
is no optimal board size due to business complexity. Other researchers such as 
Lehn (2003) and Boone (2007) show no relationship between board size and 
value. 
  105 
Research for international markets supports Lehn (2003) and Boone (2007) by 
showing no significant relationship between board size and firm value. Both Bonn 
(2004) and DiPietra (2008) present evidence of this for Australia and Italy.  
The conflicting evidence on the relationship between Board size and firm value in 
which there is no apparent agreement within the literature on the nature of such a 
relationship. This gives rise to three different hypotheses on the relationship 
between board size and value for Colombia: 
H1a – Larger Boards affect value negatively. This hypothesis is supported by 
Jensen (1976), Yermack (1996), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), De Andres et al (2005), 
Gill and Marthur (2011), Ujunwa (2012) and Kumar and Singh (2013) who argue 
that larger boards increase the possibility of having free riding directors and 
promote slower decision making affecting value negatively. 
H1b – Board size has no impact on firm value. Lehn et al (2009), Boone (2007), 
Bonn (2004) and Di Pietra (2008), who argue that board size is not related to 
value, support this hypothesis. Bonn (2004) and DiPietra (2008) in their study of 
Australia and Italy provide international evidence in favour of their argument. 
H1c – Larger Boards affect value positively. Coles et al (2007) argue that 
sometimes, due to different business realities both very large and very small 
boards affect value positively. The argument of very large boards presented by 
Coles et al (2007) supports this hypothesis. 
The author expects to test which of the preceding three hypotheses is supported 
with Colombian evidence. 
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3.2.8 Hypothesis No 2 - Board Composition  
Klapper and Love (2003) argue that governance mechanisms are needed in 
providing shareholder protection in countries where legal shareholder protection 
is weak. They argue that in these environments better monitoring is needed. 
Outside directors (independent) are believed to be better monitors of management 
and thus a larger proportion of them within the board should have a positive 
impact on firm value. (Jensen, 1983). 
Coles et al (2007) contradict the argument that board independence positively 
impacts firm value specifically in firms where more advising and less monitoring is 
needed. Others such as Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001) and Baghat and Black (1998) in their research on board composition found 
no significant relationship between board independence and value. Harris and 
Ravis (2005), Lehn et al (2009) and Dennis and Sarin (1999) argue that there is no 
ideal board composition, as it should be determined by the monitoring and/or 
advising needs of each company. 
Bonn (2004), Jackling and Johl (2009) and Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) use 
evidence from Australia, India and Spain and argue for board independence as 
having a positive impact on value.  
The research follows Jensen (1983) and Bonn (2004), Jackling and Johl (2009) and 
Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) arguments on board independence. The research 
expects to find a positive relationship between board independence (measured by 
the percentage of independent directors) and firm value for Colombia. 
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H2 – There is a positive relationship between board independence (measured by 
the percentage of independent directors) and firm value for Colombia. Klapper and 
Love (2003) argue that in a country such as Colombia, with a weak shareholder 
protection system, better monitoring performed by independent directors is 
required. This argument supports Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1983) 
Jackling and Johl (2009) and Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) 
3.2.9 Hypothesis No 3 – Corporate Governance Reforms  
Colombian Corporate Governance Law 964 of 2005 sets out the requirements for 
both board size and composition. According to this Law, boards should have no 
less than 5 and no more than 10 members with at least 25% of should be 
independent. This Law provides a detailed definition for board independence. 
Literature on the impact of Corporate Governance reforms on firm value is very 
scarce. Only limited studies try to measure the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on firm 
value with no evidence of a positive relationship between adoption of Corporate 
Governance laws and firm value (Linck et al, 2005; Wintoki, 2007; Basu and 
Dimitrov, 2005). 
In the context of Latin America, Price et al (2011) in their research on Mexican 
governance codes implementation show that even though more firms comply with 
the code guidelines, there is no relationship between this code compliance and 
firm value. An explanation for these results can be the fact that Mexico shows large 
ownership concentration, lack of protection against insider trading and weak 
minority shareholder protection (Price et al, 2011, Klapper and Love, 2003, LLSV, 
1997,1999, 2000) 
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H3 – Law 964 of 2005 has no significant relationship with firm value. Since 
Colombia shows characteristics similar to Mexico, specifically on capital market 
size, legal environment (civil law), poor law enforcement and weak shareholder 
protection the author expects the results to support Price et al (2011) by finding 
that corporate governance reforms or recommendations have no impact on value. 
3.3 Data and statistics 
The author used data from Colombian listed companies between 2001 and 2013. 
The reasons behind using data from 2001 to 2013 are: (1) The Colombian Stock 
Exchange started operating in July 2001 –three regional exchanges operated 
before, (2) Corporate governance Law 964 was published in 2005 – the data allows 
the author to examine the impact of Law 964 by using pre-Law 964 and post Law 
964 periods (3) given the small number of listed companies (between 80 and 110 
in this time period) a larger sample of years provides more observations. To 
provide more robust findings, models were run with all data included and with 
two different sets (before Law 964 and after Law 964) 
Data were obtained from the following sources: 
1. Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (Securities and Banking Commission 
– www.superfinciera.gov.co). All information is public and was downloaded 
using the Superintendencia’s web page. Current information on board of 
director’s size and composition was downloaded from this web page. 
2. Superintendencia de Sociedades (Companies commission – 
supersociedades.gov.co). Accounting information such as Assets, Liabilities, 
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Equity and Net profit were downloaded from this entity´s web page and 
confronted with the Superfinanciera´s information for quality purposes. 
3. Economatica. This source of information was used to obtain the historical 
accounting information for listed companies. 
4. DataStream, Bloomberg and Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (Colombian Stock 
Exchange). Information on stock prices and trading volume were downloaded 
from these sources. All three were used since information is not complete in 
any. 
5. Individual company´s web pages and annual reports. Historical information on 
board of directors characteristics was either taken from each individual web 
page or by making phone calls to their investor relation offices. 
Data on the following variables (a description of the variables is presented) was 
uploaded into Stata where regressions were run: 
1. Tobins Q: This study uses Tobins Q as a proxy for value and as the 
dependent variable. It is defined as the relationship between market price 
and book value of company assets (Equity market value + book value of 
liabilities/replacement “book” value of assets). Most of the literature uses 
Tobins Q and it can be considered a valid variable since it focuses on market 
value and companies included in the sample are only liquid companies. 
2. Board Size: This independent variable is the key testing the hypothesis No 
1. For this study it is defined as the number of board members. The author 
will use the square of this value in the regression model to test for a 
nonlinear relationship between board size and firm value. The author 
expects this variable to show no significant relationship with Tobins Q. 
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3. Percentage of Independent Directors: This independent variable is also 
fundamental for testing hypothesis No 2. It is defined as the percentage of 
independent directors within the board (Number of independent 
Directors/total number of Directors). The author used the definition of 
Independent Directors provided by Law 964. The author expects this 
variable to have a positive significant relationship with Tobins Q and thus 
for its coefficient to be positive. 
4. Law 964/2005: This independent variable is a dummy variable and it will 
show whether the observation was from either before (0) or after the 
implementation of such law (1). This variable will help in testing hypothesis 
No 3. The author expects no relationship between this variable and Tobins 
Q. 
5. Family Ownership: This independent variable is a control dummy variable 
and it will show whether the company is family owned  (1) or not family 
owned (0). Literature presents mixed evidence on the impact that family 
ownership has on firm value. Authors such as Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Beehr, Drexler and Faulkner (1997), Daily and Dollinger (1992), 
McConaugy, Matthews and Fialko (2001) argue that due to a decrease in the 
monitoring costs in the firm that arise from family ownership the 
relationship between this two must be positive.  
On the other side other academics such as Gallo, Tapias and Cappuyins 
(2000), Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel and Gutierrez (2001), Dyer (2003) 
argue that the relationship is the opposite because a new agency conflict 
arises.  
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6. Log Sales: The author used this control variable as a proxy for firm size. It 
is defined as the logarithmical value for the total number of sales for each 
year. Since the period used in this study (2000-2010) was a period of very 
low inflation for Colombia (low single digits) no adjustment for inflation is 
needed. Coles et al (2007) and Yermack (1996) argued that as firm size 
increases so does the size of the board. Since Colombia has a small stock 
market the author expects size to be positively related to value. 
7. GDP Growth: The author used this independent variable to control for the 
growth that the country is having in its economy. The information from this 
variable was taken from the World Bank database and shows the growth of 
GDP in Colombia for this period. 
8. Liquidity Index: The liquidity index variable takes values from 1 to 5 
depending how liquid the company´s stock was in that year. The greater the 
number the greater the liquidity that it will have. The sample only contains 
variables with values from 3 to 5 and was generated with the information 
given by the Colombian Stock Exchange information. 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 14 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables in the 
model that included all observations in one dataset. Table 14 shows the T-tests 
that were generated, having as fixed variable Law 964. This test shows if there is a 
significant difference between pre and after law periods for each variable. Also the 
table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables from before and after law 
respectively.   
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Average Tobins Q for the complete sample is 1,06 with a standard deviation of 
0,63. It varies from a minimum of 0,1 to a maximum of 4,48. It rises from an 
average of 0,85 for 2001 to 2005 (before the law) to 1,16 for 2006 to 2013 (after 
the law); this change is statistically significant as the two sample t test with equal 
variances shows the difference to be statistically significant at Pr(T>t)= 0,000. 
Board size shows a similar pattern. From 2001 to 2009 Colombian boards had an 
average of 5,93 directors with a standard deviation of 1,49. Board size varied from 
a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 10. Again, as with Tobins Q the difference of the 
means for Board Size from before and after the law appears is statistically 
significant, average board size grew from 5,75 (2001 to 2005) to 6.02 (2006 to 
2013).  
Board independence, measured by the percentage of independent directors shows 
an average of 41% with a standard deviation of 22%. These results range from a 
minimum of 0% (no independent directors on the board) to a maximum of 100% 
(all directors are independent). Average percentage of independents changes from 
33% for data prior to 2005 to 45% for data later than 2005. A two sample t test 
with equal variances shows the difference to be significant at Pr(T>t)= 0,0 It is 
important to report that 28 observations from 2006 to 2013 are below the 
mandatory 25% minimum proportion of independent directors required by the 
law. This finding might imply lack of control by the governing agency responsible 
for overseeing law implementation. 
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Family ownership is only present in 23% of the samples having less importance, 
with 20% in the period before the law implementation, than after with 24%. This 
difference is insignificant. 
Tables also contain the descriptive statistics for the control variables. Log Sales, 
which was used as a proxy for firm size presents an average of 15.64 with a 
standard deviation of 4.35, again showing large variability of the sampled data. It 
goes from an average of 13.23 (2001 to 2005) to an average of 16.83 (2006 to 
2013). These results show an important increase (statistically significant) in the 
size of listed firms, which is consistent with both the growth of the Colombian 
economy during that period but also the listing of the Colombian oil company (now 
the largest listed company in Colombia).  GDP growth presents an average of 
4,49% with a standard deviation of 1,62% it goes from an average of 4,12% to an 
average of 4,67%. This difference is significant and is consistent with the growth of 
the Colombian economy. 
Liquidity Index was used as a proxy for liquidity and presents an average of 3,78 
with a standard deviation of 0.98 This large difference shows that there is an 
important variability in the liquidity of firms, which confirms the fact that 
Colombia, as many other countries has a small and illiquid market where 
companies show different levels of liquidity. 
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Table 14 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14.1 includes information (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) for the complete sample. 
Table 14.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean SD Min Max 
TobinsQ 406 1.06 0.63 0.10 4.48 
Boardsize 406 5.93 1.49 2.00 10.00 
PercIndepDirec 406 0.41 0.22 0.00 1.00 
GDPgrowth 406 4.49 1.62 1.65 6.90 
LiqIndex 406 3.78 0.98 3.00 5.00 
LogSales 406 15.64 4.35 7.32 24.93 
FamOwn 406 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 14.2 includes information of the difference of mean test for the variable Law in 
which Mean (0) Information prior to corporate governance implementation and Mean (1): 
Information after corporate governance implementation. 
Table 14.2. Difference of means test (law) 
 Mean (0) SD Mean (1) SD Pr  
TobinsQ 0.85 0.53 1.16 0.66 0.00 
Board Size 5.75 1.47 6.02 1.49 0.09 
PercIndepDirec 33% 0.20 45% 0.22 0.00 
Log Sales 13.23 3.80 16.83 4.11 0.00 
Family Own 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.35 
GDP Growth 4.12 1.10 4.67 1.80 0.00 
Liq Index 3.66 0.94 3.84 0.99 0.08 
 
Table 14.3 includes information (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) for the sample before law implementation. 
Table 14.3. Descriptive statistics Before Law 
 Obs Mean SD Min Max 
TobinsQ 134 0.85 0.53 0.10 4.48 
Boardsize 134 5.75 1.47 2.00 10.00 
PercIndepDirec 134 0.33 0.20 0.00 1.00 
GDPgrowth 134 4.12 1.10 1.68 5.33 
LiqIndex 134 3.66 0.94 3.00 5.00 
LogSales 134 13.23 3.80 7.32 21.70 
FamOwn 134 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
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Table 14.4 includes information (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) for the sample after law implementation. 
Table 14.4. Descriptive statistics After Law 
 Obs Mean SD Min Max 
TobinsQ 272 1.16 0.66 0.22 4.14 
Boardsize 272 6.02 1.49 3.00 10.00 
PercIndepDirec 272 0.45 0.22 0.00 1.00 
GDPgrowth 272 4.67 1.80 1.65 6.90 
LiqIndex 272 3.84 0.99 3.00 5.00 
LogSales 272 16.83 4.11 8.71 24.93 
FamOwn 272 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
3.4 Model 
The author looked at different possible models, and decided to use the widely used 
OLS regression that included analysis of the variables for a company over time. 
Since most of the literature uses OLS by using this model comparisons can be made 
among this study and studies from other countries. This was achieved by using the 
Stata’s cluster command that helped compare evolution of variables within the 
same company between 2001 and 2013). The author also ran regressions without 
using the dummy variable of Law 964 and compared results on the relationship 
between board characteristics and value for both 2001-2005 and 2006-2013 
periods, these results helped to validate the model and let the author compare 
basic statistics between those periods.  
The equation included not only the variables the author wanted to test (Board size, 
Board composition, Family Ownership and impact of law 964) but also some 
control variables used in the literature (size, GDP growth and liquidity). The author 
also decided to use the panel data set and lagged values of Tobins Q since previous 
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performance may affect the firm’s present performance. Finally the author 
included dummy variables for each year that will help to control for time effects.  
The following model was employed:  
Firm Value (Tobin’s Q) = Constant + B0* Board Size + B1* Board independence 
(Percentage of independents) + B2 Family Ownership + B3* Firm Size 
(LogSales) + B4 GDP growth + B5* Law 964 implementation (Dummy) + 
B6*Liquidity Index + B7*LagTobinsQ + B8 Dummy2001+…B20 Dummy 2012 
+error.   
Tobin’s Q is the dependant variable as a proxy for value consistent with previous 
literature (Yermack, 1996, Coles et al, 2007). The four main independent variables 
mentioned in the three hypotheses were board size, board independence, family 
ownership and impact of law 964. The author used percentage of independents as 
a proxy for board independence in the equation. If Board independence, as agency 
theory suggests affects value positively the author can expect for its regression 
coefficient to be positive. Law implementation was used as a dummy variable only 
for the complete sample since two other samples were used, one for observations 
before the law and another one for observations after the law. As mentioned in 
hypothesis No 3 the author expects no relationship between this variable and firm 
value. 
As for the control variables the author used firm size, GDP growth, time dummies 
and liquidity as most of the literature does (Coles et al, 2007, Yermack, 1996). 
Prior research mentions that as firms grow they have more needs for contracting 
and thus require larger boards (Coles et al, 2007). The author follows this 
argument and expects for Log Sales to have a positive relationship with not only 
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board size but also with value. As for liquidity, the author used it as a control 
variable due to the fact that in small, imperfect, illiquid markets such as Colombia, 
liquidity has a direct impact on price. For this reason the author expects liquidity 
to have a positive relationship with firm value. 
The author also ran similar regressions for the samples of before and after the law 
in which he did not use the laws dummy variable. This allowed getting better, 
more robust results on the model by allowing the author to compare means and 
distribution of the variables observed in the two samples. 
3.5 Results 
Results on the regression showed an R-squared of 0.7654 (a), suggesting that 
76,54% of the variations of Tobins Q are explained by the independent variables.  
There was no problem of multi-colinearity since the highest correlation is 0,51 
(see correlation matrix), which is lower than the maximum acceptable level (0,8) 
of multi-colinearity (Gujarati, 2004). This provides validity to regression results  
Results from running the regression with datasets from before and after Law 964 
show results with R-squared changing from 0,5863 (e) to 0,8227 (f). However in 
both data samples (before and after Law 964) all independent variables (Board 
Size, family ownership and Proportion of Independents) show no statistical 
significant relationships with Tobins Q, which means that those variables do not 
appear to be related to firm value and therefore assessments on the hypotheses 
can be inferred. 
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Results show board size to be positively related to value (0,02) but this 
relationship is not only very small (magnitude of the coefficient) but also not 
significant. This supports Hypothesis No. 1b by providing evidence of no significant 
relationship (linear or nonlinear) between Firm Value (Tobins Q) and Board Size 
for Colombia. Complementary regressions support these results by showing both 
low and insignificant magnitude coefficients.  
 
Table 15 Correlation Matrix Colombia 
Correlation matrix for the complete sample 
 Tobins
Q 
Boardsiz
e 
PercIndepD
irec 
GDPgrowth LiqInde
x 
LogSale
s 
FamOw
n 
TobinsQ 1.00             
Boardsize 0.05 1.00      
PercIndepDir
ec 
0.08 0.09 1.00     
GDPgrowth 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 1.00    
LiqIndex -0.10 0.03 0.23 0.03 1.00   
LogSales 0.25 0.41 0.51 -0.09 0.14 1.00  
FamOwn -0.17 -0.13 -0.24 0.04 0.01 -0.24 1.00 
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Table 16 Regressions 
 
 
Regressions summary table. Six regressions are show in which (a) is conclusive regression and the other 5 are 
complementary. (e) and (f) are regressions for years before and after law implementation. While (b), (c) and (d) 
are without lagged value of Tobin`s Q, without year dummy variables and boardsize as dependent. All these 
regressions are useful to prove the results obtain in column (a). 
 (a) (b) ( c ) (d) ( e) (f) 
  Tobin´sQ Tobin´sQ Tobin´sQ BoardSize Tobin´sQ Tobin´sQ 
Constant _0.56*** -0.014 _0.31*** 4.06*** -0.21 -0.3562166 
 0.1350138 0.318 0.103 0.9440932 0.31 0.1074708 
Boardsize 0.021718 0.044 0.025  -0.0007444 0.0177757 
 0.015948 0.051 0.015  0.0344147 0.0164475 
%IndepDirec -0.0811845 -0.011 -0.100 -1.134161 -0.3252103 -0.0153502 
 0.1034293 0.322 0.130 0.7536485 0.3206462 0.0813179 
Law 0.24*** 0.16* 0.047 -0.7583638   
 0.062112 0.096 0.058 0.6933206   
LogSales 0.03* 0.03* 0.011 0.1077337 0.031251 0.03*** 
 0.0102958 0.017 0.007 0.0948475 0.0198311 0.0099096 
Fam Own -0.0207051 -0.174 _0.05* -0.4553196 -0.035815 -0.0154253 
 0.0278966 0.121 0.031 0.348269 0.0807924 0.0303385 
GDPgrowt 0.0112497 0.022 0.03*** -0.0298678 0.0482771 0.0085414 
 0.0124086 0.015 0.010 0.0363157 0.0293744 0.0132761 
LidIndex 0.0184389 0.037 0.024 0.41* 0.013626 -0.0102064 
 0.0267762 0.073 0.026 0.1924845 0.0393476 0.0273576 
L.Tobin´sQ 0.78***  0.79*** -0.0566923 0.52*** 0.82*** 
 0.080798  0.083 0.2371623 0.1526636 0.0637069 
d2003 0.15**   -0.9641669 0.0299779  
 0.0727436   0.6412106 0.0471575  
d2004 0.19**   -0.9070706 (dropped)  
 0.0764538   0.6640234   
d2005 0.28***   -1.014511 0.11***  
 0.0783769   0.6644249 0.0665412  
d2006 0.20*   -0.3456548   
 0.1068028   0.2192396   
d2007 (dropped)   (dropped)  (dropped) 
       
d2008 -0.0019372   _0.37*  -0.0086644 
 0.0408317   0.1751739  0.0434645 
d2009 (dropped)   (dropped)  (dropped) 
       
d2010 0.0373576   -0.5420585  -0.0134082 
 0.1005134   0.5974332  0.0866171 
d2011 -0.0574083   -0.4763952  _0.10*** 
 0.1066056   0.6525458  0.0923262 
d2012 _0.32***   -0.4848572  _0.38*** 
 0.0974817   0.6530545  0.1021134 
d2013 -0.190489   -0.6534161  _0.24*** 
 0.07***   0.6167512  0.0708569 
Tobin´sQ    0.3919089   
    0.2828329   
R2 0.7654 0.1531 0.737 0.2489 0.5863 0.8227 
Adj R2 0.7522 0.1382 0.7302 0.2067   
Standard errors below coef  (*pr>0.1 - **pr>0.05 – ***pr>0.01) 
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Results also show no significant relationship between board composition 
(percentage of independent directors) and Firm value (Tobins Q) (coefficient at -
0.08). This result contradicts Hypothesis No 2, which expected the relationship to 
be both positive and significant.  
Results show a positive significant relationship between Law 964 implementation 
and Tobins Q (coefficient at 0,24 with 1% significance). This result contradicts 
previous literature (Price et al, 2011 and Wintoki, 2007) as it shows a positive 
relationship between Corporate Governance reform and firm value. As reported 
before the research used law as an aggregate measure of change in Corporate 
Governance and results show that there is a significant impact in firm value; 
however when looking at specific components, i.e. board size and independence, 
results find them not related to firm value.  
Family ownership, a control variable showed to be not related to firm value at any 
level, which indicates that there appears to be no relationship between the fact 
that a company is family owned and its value.   
It is important to report the possibility of reverse causation between firm value 
(Tobins Q) and board size, meaning that good or bad results might drive 
shareholders to either change their boards of directors or even appoint more 
directors for either advise or control. In order to check against reverse causation 
the author ran two further regressions, one with a lag of one period between board 
size and Tobins Q and another one with Tobins Q as an independent variable and 
board size (presented in column d in Table 16) as the dependent variable and 
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found no significant relationship between these two variables. The results showed 
no reverse causation, which provides robustness to the results.  
Other two regressions in columns b and c were made to show how the final 
regression was generated. The first of them (b) was made without taking into 
consideration both the lagged value of the Tobin´s Q and the dummy variables. 
This regression showed a very low R-squared indicating that either the lagged 
value or the dummy variables were needed. Column c included the lagged value of 
Tobin´s Q but not the year dummy effect (which does not include time varying 
effects). 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this paper the author studied three main corporate governance issues within 
the Colombian context, first whether board size has any impact on firm value, 
second whether more independent boards lead to higher firm value and last 
whether the adoption of Corporate Governance law, Law 964 of 2005, had a 
positive impact on firm value. Results show that board size is not significantly 
related to firm value for Colombia. They also show that board composition is not 
related to firm value, thus providing evidence to conclude that there is no 
relationship between board structure variables such as size and composition and 
firm value for Colombian listed companies. Implementation and adoption of Law 
964 of 2005 shows a significant positive relationship with firm value.  
This paper adds to literature by providing evidence of the relationship of board 
characteristics and governance reforms on value for an emerging market such as 
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Colombia. This paper is valuable for regulators in their quest to assess the impact 
of Corporate Governance laws; it is also valuable for investors (both foreign and 
local) in assessing risk for equity investments in Colombia by showing them that 
board characteristics are not related to firm value. 
Since literature on corporate governance is still limited for emerging markets there 
are numerous opportunities for research. Aspects of corporate governance 
deserving further study are variables such as ownership structure, management 
compensation and other board dynamics. The latter could include board diversity 
(gender ratios, cultural bias, and mix of professional backgrounds), board capital 
(defined as the ability of board directors to both monitor and advise companies, 
Jermias and Gani, 2014), frequency of meetings, and board member age. Greater 
knowledge of these factors will be valuable in the quest for understanding 
emerging markets and their drivers for value creation.  
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4 CEO Duality and Firm Value: Evidence from Mexico 
4.1 Introduction 
The corporate scandals of the late 90’s and the early 00’s have given Corporate 
Governance research and practice increased attention. Regulation (Sarbanes –
Oxley and OECD Principles for Corporate Governance) has been developed to 
improve governance practices worldwide. Most of it has been based on agency 
theory and focused on defining guidelines for the Board of Directors.  
Corporate Governance literature has been focused mainly on UK and US companies 
with very little research on emerging markets such as Mexico, where regulation 
and the economic environment are different.  
Research on the Board of Directors as a Corporate Governance mechanism is 
plentiful, however most of the literature on Boards of Directors has focused on 
Board size and composition. Little research has been done on other board 
characteristics, most notably the importance of the CEO/Chairman duality.  
Agency theory states that independent boards provide better monitoring of 
management and thus create value. A dual leadership promotes management 
entrenchment and management behavior (such as appointment of nonqualified 
board members) that could hamper the effectiveness of monitoring done by the 
Board. Stewardship theory contradicts agency theory by arguing that duality 
increases accountability and is less costly.   
Stewardship theory  presents an interesting contrast to agency theory by studying 
the conditions in which agents act in the principals best interest rather that on sefl-
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interest (Shillemans, 2012) . Davis et al (1997) suggests that the perspective 
changes from one of control (agency theory) to one of focusing on the premises 
under which stewardship works. The word steward to monarchical times where a 
person serves and represents the monarchy, and thus is not expected to act as 
independent agent with interests different than the ones of the principal.  
Shillemans (2012) summarizes various contrasting assumptions between agency 
theory and stewardship theory by suggesting that stewards are motivated by 
collective goals (intrinsic motivation, i.e. reputation, realization, acknowledgment) 
rather by self-interest (extrinsic motivation, i.e financial incentives). He also 
suggests that agents require more control while stewards are more autonomous. 
Stewardship Theory´s biggest differences with Agency Theory in the Corporate 
Governance context lie in both the treatment of CEO Duality and on board 
independence. Stewardship theory argues for a unified, stronger leadership and a 
more insider oriented board, where agents are aligned with shareholders and 
advise is more important than control. Agency Theory, on the other hand argues 
for no duality and for more independent boards since both these characteristics 
provide better control and thus better shareholder protection. 
Empirical evidence is mixed on the relationship between CEO duality and value, 
while some authors support agency theory on the negative impact of duality on 
value others support stewardship theory by arguing for a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and firm value. There is even evidence of no relationship 
between CEO duality and firm value.  
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Daily and Dalton (1992), Cho and Kim, (2007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Chen et al (2005) Chanie and Thome, (2009), Ehikoya 
(2009), lam and Lee (2008), Pok and Sheik, (2012) and Dogan et al. (2013) support 
agency theory by providing evidence of a negative relationship between CEO 
Duality and firm value; Jermias and Gani (2014) even suggest that board capital 
(the ability of board directors to both monitor and advise management) mitigates 
this negative effect . Other authors such as Agrawal and Knoebler (1996), Peng, 
Zhang and Li (2007), Yang and Zhao (2014), Gill and Marthur (2011) and Baptista, 
Klotze and Campelo de Melo (2008) support stewardship theory and find a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Basak et al (2013) 
provide evidence of a positive relationship in the restaurant industry in the US. 
Randami and van Wittenloostuijn (2010) in their study from Korea, Indonesia, 
Malasya and Thailand found CEO Duality to be positively related for average 
performing firms but not for either high or low performing ones which suggests a 
non linear relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Another trend in 
literature remains neutral when referring to this relationship. Abdullah (2004), 
Braun, Sharma (2007), Faleye (2007), Elsayed (2007) and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) 
using evidence from US companies, and Raluca (2013) and Amba (2013) (using 
evidence from Romania and Bahrain) find that there is no significant relationship 
between firm´s performance and CEO duality.  
Research on the impact of Corporate Governance laws on firm value is scarce with 
research mostly being conducted for the US (Sarbanes-Oxley Act impact on 
corporate value). Most of the literature agrees on the lack of a positive relationship 
between governance reforms (SOX) and firm value (Linck et al, 2005; Wintoki, 
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2007; Basu and Dimitrov, 2005). International evidence is even more limited; Price 
et al (2011) conducted research on governance recommendations and firm value 
for Mexico and found no relationship between them. Their research did not include 
reforms, only recommendations. On the other hand Chong et al (2009) found that 
better governance (due to compliance with the Code of Better Practices for 
Mexico) is positively related to performance. 
Mexico’s business environment has evolved over the last three decades. It has 
changed from a government-controlled environment (80´s) to an open market 
dominated by private ownership (90’s and 00’s) (Price et al., 2011). This dramatic 
change, along with the size of the Mexican consumer market (population of more 
than 100 million) has attracted large amounts of foreign investment thus 
increasing the need for corporate governance in companies. 
Mexico is the second largest economy in Latin America, just behind Brazil and way 
ahead of Colombia and Argentina. Its model of Corporate Governance, as with the 
rest of Latin American countries, is closely related to the Continental European 
model. However it presents unique features such as a small capital market (La 
Porta et al , 1999), weak protection of shareholders (La Porta et al, 1999), a weak 
legal system (Klapper and Love, 2003) and high ownership concentration in 
founding families (LLSV, 1997,1999,2000). 
Literature on Corporate Governance in Mexico is scarce. There is research only in 
governance as a whole (Husted and Serrano, 2002), governance recommendations 
and reforms (Machuga and Teitel, 2009 and Price et al, 2011), ownership (Klapper 
and Love, 2003 and LLSV, 1999).  Mexico implemented a new governance law in 
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2006, which followed Sarbanes-Oxley principles of limiting board size and defining 
guidelines that promote board independence. 
This research complements prior research on Colombia by introducing a new 
variable, CEO Duality and its relationship to value in an emerging market 
environment. Duality is not allowed in Colombia but it is allowed in Mexico, which 
presents an interesting topic for research since literature presents different views 
on its relationship to firm value.  
This paper adds to literature by providing evidence of the impact of CEO duality as 
a corporate governance variable on firm value with data from Mexico. It also 
provides evidence of the relationship between board characteristics, family 
ownership and governance reforms and firm value for an emerging market such as 
Mexico. This study is valuable for shareholders and directors in Mexico. Through 
better governance firms should be able to increase their access to external 
financing, by decreasing risk and lowering their cost of capital, their value 
increases and they should be able to attract more investors (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2012) . It is also valuable for regulators in their quest to assess whether 
governance laws based on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have a positive impact on value 
in emerging markets where economic and legal environments are different. 
 The paper used data of listed companies from the Mexican Stock Exchange for the 
2000-2012 period since it allowed the author to have enough observations from 
before and after the new stock market law of 2006 was adopted, thus enabling 
assessment of its impact on value. Empirical results showed that there is no 
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relationship between CEO duality and value after controlling for board 
characteristics such as size and independence.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review, Section 
3 explains the hypothesis, Section 4 reviews the research methodology, describing 
data and statistics, Section 5 presents the results and discusses the findings while 
Section 6 concludes and explains research limitations 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 CEO/Chairman Duality 
As reported before, Agency theory and stewardship theory present conflicting 
views on the impact of CEO duality on firm value. Agency theory argues for board 
independence as a better mechanism for monitoring management, meaning that by 
separating these two roles management entrenchment is controlled and boards 
become more independent and thus create value. On the other hand stewardship 
theory argues that a unified leadership (CEO and Chairman of the Board being the 
same person) increases accountability, is less costly and consequently creates 
value.  
Authors such as Braun, Sharma (2007) and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) using evidence 
from largely US family controlled companies find no relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. Raluca (2013) and Amba (2013) using evidence 
from Bahrain and Romania got similar results. Yan Lam and Kam Lee (2007) in 
their study from Hong Kong found that duality’s impact or relationship with 
performance depends on whether companies are family or non-family owned. 
  129 
They found CEO duality to have a positive impact on value for non-family firms and 
non-duality to have a positive impact for family firms. They based their argument 
on the relationship between the benefits and costs to shareholders in the 
monitoring of management (non-duality for family firms) and also on the benefits 
and costs of knowing the business and being able to align all governance structures 
more efficiently (duality for non-family firms).   
Evidence supporting stewardship theory (in which a positive and significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm value) could be found for big 
economies. Peng, Zhang and Li (2007), Yang and Zhao (2010), and Baptista, Klotze 
and Campelo de Melo (2008) found this relationship to be positive and significant 
with evidence from China, US, Canada and Brazil respectively. 
Evidence supporting agency theory can also be found. Klein, Shapiro and Young 
(2004) used a sample of 236 Canadian firms and found a positive relation between 
a non-dual CEO structure and firm value while Pok and Al Sheik (2012) got similar 
results for the emerging market of Saudi Arabia. No research has been conducted 
on the relationship between CEO duality and firm value for Mexico. 
4.2.2 Corporate Governance and Value in Mexico 
Research on corporate governance for Mexico is very limited. Some of it comes 
from studies on Latin America (LLSV, 1999 and Klapper and Love, 2003), where 
authors find that Mexico, similar to other Latin American countries, shows weak 
shareholder protection and high levels of ownership concentration. Other authors 
who focus solely on Mexico find similar results (Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 
2001). More recent studies on corporate governance for Mexico have focused on 
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the impact of governance recommendations and guidelines on value. Manchuga 
and Teitel (2009) and Price et al (2011) agree on the lack of evidence of a positive 
impact on value due to the implementation of such recommendations. Chong et al 
(2009) provides evidence that when companies in Mexico implemented 
differentiating governance tools effectively they were able to get lower costs of 
capital and thus increased their value.  
4.2.3 Governance reforms and value 
Since most governance reforms were implemented after the corporate scandals of 
the last fifteen years literature on the subject is limited. Sarbanes Oxley has been 
used as the main guideline for ideal governance both in the US and globally (most 
reforms were based on Sarbanes Oxley). Sarbanes Oxley is consistent with agency 
theory principles, putting emphasis on board size and independence as vehicles to 
protect shareholders against value destruction. On board composition it sets a 
minimum of independent board members needed to monitor management 
effectively. Evidence shows no positive relationship between Sarbanes Oxley and 
firm value, arguing against agency theory. Authors such as Linck et al (2005), 
Wintoki (2007) and Basu and Dimitrov (2005) in their research on Sarbanes-
Oxley’s impact on firm value found no significant relationship between a 
governance reform and value. Price et al (2011) found no relationship between 
recommendations (code of best practices) and value for Mexico. They argue that 
companies comply more with governance guidelines but that this compliance does 
not impact value positively.  
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The Mexican government issued a Stock Markets Law (Ley del Mercado de 
Valores) on December 30, 2005 to be implemented and adopted starting January 1, 
2006. This law redefined and regulated the operation of all agents and parties 
related to the stock market. Among other things it followed OECD Latin American 
White Paper on Corporate Governance and regulated size and composition of 
Board of Directors for listed companies. Section I of this law sets clear 
requirements on the maximum number of board members (21 maximum, no 
minimum) and on the minimum proportion of independent directors (25% 
minimum, no maximum) (Article 24). It also sets requirements for the creation of 
at least two committees (auditing and good practices) to be made up only with 
independent members and defines what it means to be independent (Article 26). 
The final two articles of the first section define very clearly the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors of listed companies. It even mentions 
value creation for all shareholders as a major responsibility. 
There is hardly any research on the impact or relationship between governance 
law and firm value for Mexico.  
4.3 Hypothesis development 
4.3.1 Hypothesis No 1 – CEO Duality  
Literature presents mixed evidence of the CEO duality and its relationship to the 
firm value. While it is true that some authors such as Klein et al (2004) and Pok 
and Al Sheik (2012) support agency theory by arguing that CEO duality has a 
negative relationship with value, other authors get results that support 
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stewardship theory by finding a positive relationship between duality and value 
such as Peng, Zhang and Li (2007) in China during their institutional change, Yang 
and Zhao (2010) through the shock generated by the commerce deal between 
Canada and the US and Baptista, Klotze and Campelo de Melo (2008) for Brazil. 
Braun, Sharma (2007) using evidence from large family controlled US companies, 
Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) for US companies, and Raluca (2013) and Amba (2013) 
found a non-significant relationship. Yan Lam and Kam Lee (2007) present 
different findings for Hong Kong, they argue that duality is good for non-family 
firms while non-duality is good for family firms due to costs and benefits of 
monitoring and advising. 
The lack of agreement in the literature makes it interesting to investigate whether 
there is a significant relationship between CEO duality and the firm value in 
Mexico. This generates three hypotheses: 
H1 a: There is a positive and significant relationship between CEO duality and the 
firm value in Mexico. 
H1 b: There is no significant relationship between CEO duality and the firm value 
in Mexico.  
H1 c: There is a significant negative relationship between the CEO duality and the 
firm value in Mexico. 
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4.4  Data and statistics 
This study used data from 101 Mexican listed companies with 914 observations 
from the period between 2000 and 2013.  The reasons behind using this sample 
are: (1) Corporate Governance Law (ley del Mercado de Valores) was published in 
2006 which helps in testing the impact of such law by using pre and post 2006 
periods. (2) The advantage of taking such a large sample of years provides more 
observations and thus providing robustness to the results.  
It is important to mention that the study didn´t take into consideration the 
observations from Televisa, one of Mexico´s biggest companies, due to very high 
Tobin´s Q values which distorted the sample.  
Board data (Duality, Size, Composition) was obtained from individual company’s 
annual reports. All financial figures were obtained from the Mexican Stock 
Exchange information system and validated from annual reports. Information on 
the governance law was obtained from the Mexico Stock Exchange webpage. 
The following data variables were used in the analysis: 
Tobin’s Q: Most literature uses Tobin´s Q as the dependent variable and as 
a proxy for value and this study will do so as well. It is defined as the 
relationship between market price and book value of company assets 
(Equity market value + book value of liabilities/replacement “book” value of 
assets). This study also used ROA (Net Profit/ book value of assets – used in 
the literature as a proxy for performance) as dependent variable to provide 
robustness to the model. 
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Duality: This is a dummy variable and can be defined as 1, when CEO and 
chairman of the board are the same person and 0 when they are not. This 
independent variable is fundamental in testing Hypothesis 1.  
Board Size: This is a control variable, it can be defined as the number of 
board members.  
Percentage of Independent Directors: This is also a control variable. It is 
defined as the proportion of independent directors within the board 
(number of independent Directors/total number of Directors). All reports 
from the data (company annual reports) differentiate independent board 
members from non-independents by following the OECD recommendations 
and descriptions from the 2006 Law.  
Family Ownership: It is a control variable and a Dummy variable with 1 
being all the companies that are considered to be family owned and 0 being 
all the observations that are not. This study considered that a family owned 
a company when one family held more than 35% of the shares. The 
information for this variable was obtained from the annual reports for each 
company that can be obtained from the Mexican Stock Exchange webpage. 
Corporate Governance Law: This is a control variable. It is a dummy 
variable in the model with 1 being all observations after the publication and 
implementation of the law and 0 being all observations before the 
implementation of the law.  
GDP Growth:  This is a control variable since overall performance by the 
Mexican economy can have a direct effect in the value of Mexican 
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companies. The information comes from the database provided by the 
World Bank.  
Log Sales: This study will use this control variable as a proxy for firm size. 
Coles et al (2007) and Yermack (1996) argued that as firm size increases so 
does the size of the board. By following this argument results are expected 
to show sales to be related to board size. A logarithmical value of this 
variable is used to soften the impact. 
Liquidity Index: The liquidity index measures the amount of times that a 
certain stock of a company is traded within a certain period. The index is 
generated for the Mexican Stock Market and takes value from 1 to 10, 1 
being the minimum value given to stocks with low liquidity and 10 the 
maximum value given to stocks with high levels of liquidity. This variable 
helps to control for higher or lower liquidity, which might impact firm 
value. 
4.4.1    Descriptive Statistics 
Table 17 shows the summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables in the 
model. Table 17 presents the difference of means tests that were made for each 
variable to prove whether there is statistical significance in the difference between 
groups (before and after law). This will be useful to determine whether board´s 
and firm´s characteristics change significantly between periods.  
Average Tobin´s Q for the period is 1.76 with a standard deviation of 3.21. It varies 
from a minimum of 0.01 to a maximum of 57.78. It rises from an average of 1.27 for 
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the period before the implementation of the law to 2.06 for the period after the 
implementation (Table 17). A two sample t test with equal variances show the 
difference of 0.79 to be statistically significant at Pr(T>t)= 0.0000. This means that 
company`s value increased after the law was implemented. 
CEO Duality presents an average of 0.44 with a standard deviation of 0.50.  It has 
an average value of 0.44 before law implementation and 0.43 after. It can be 
assumed the small difference that could exist between the two periods is not 
statically significant with a Pr(T>t)= 0.79. This shows that on average Mexican 
companies maintained their leadership structures before and after the law. 
Table 17 Descriptive Statistics Mexico 
Table 17 contains the descriptive statistics for the complete sample. 
 Obs Mean SD Min Max 
TobinsQ 914 
 
1.76 3.21 0.01 57.78 
Boardsize 914 
 
11.70 3.66 4.00 21.00 
PercIndepDirec 914 
 
0.45 0.18 0.11 1.00 
Duality 914 
 
0.44 
 
0.50 0.00 1.00 
Law 914 
 
0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LogSales 914 
 
15.94 1.76 9.21 20.32 
FamOwn 914 
 
0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
GDP growth 914 
 
2.45 2.71 -4.70 5.30 
Liq Index 914 
 
5.87 2.19 0.01 9.66 
Board size showed an average of 11.7 directors with a standard deviation of 3.66.  
This variable changed from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 21 members. The 
mean grew from 11.61 (2000 to 2006) to 11.76 (2007 to 2013) (See table 18). A 
two sample t test with equal variances showed the difference of 0.15 which is 
statistically insignificant  
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Board independence, measured by the percentage of independent directors 
showed an average of 0.45 with a standard deviation of 0.18; these results range 
from a minimum of 11% to a maximum of 100% (Grupo SIMEC between 2003 and 
2009 had a board of directors where all directors were independent). The average 
percentage of independent directors changes from 0.42 for data prior to 2006 to 
0.47 for data after 2006. A two sample t test with equal variances showed the 
difference to be statistically significant at Pr(T>t)= 0.00. This means that the 
percentage of independents changed significantly between the two above-
mentioned periods.  
Firm´s ownership by a family has a mean of 0.68 in the sample, indicating that 68% 
of the observations for the companies studied are family owned. This is consistent 
for emerging economies where markets are small and ownership is concentrated 
(LLSV, 1998; Klapper and Love, 2003). This result doesn´t change much between 
periods. It has a value of 0.71 before and 0.66 after the implementation of 
governance regulations. This difference is not significant with a Pr(T>t)= 0.10, 
meaning that ownership structure did not change during the sample period.  
Table 18 Difference of means Test Governance Law Mexico 
Table 18 includes information of the difference of mean test for the variable Law in which Mean (0) 
Information prior to corporate governance implementation and Mean (1): Information after 
corporate governance implementation. 
 Mean (0) SD Mean (1) SD Pr 
TobinsQ 1.27 1.50 2.06 3.87 0.00 
Boardsize 11.61 3.67 11.76 3.66 0.55 
PercIndepDirec 0.42 0.17 0.47 0.18 0.00 
Duality 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.79 
LogSales 15.81 1.69 16.01 1.79 0.08 
FamOwn 0.71 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.10 
GDP growth 3.09 1.83 2.06 3.06 0.00 
Liq Index 6.32 1.98 5.59 2.26 0.00 
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Tables 17 and 20 also contain the descriptive statistics for the control variables. 
GDP growth has a mean of 2.45 that changed from 3.09 to 2.06 between periods. 
This difference, as can be expected by the changes in GDP growth after the 
financial crisis of 2008, turned out to be significant in the t-test with a Pr(T>t)= 
0.0000. Log Sales, the proxy variable for firm size, presents an average of 15.94 
with a standard deviation of 1.76 going from a minimum value of 9.2 to a 
maximum of 20.3. It goes from an average of 15.81 (2000 to 2006) to an average of 
16.01 (2007 to 2013) (see table 17). A two group t test with equal variances 
showed the difference to be statistically significant at Pr(T>t)= 0.08. These results 
show an important increase (statistically significant) on the size of listed firms, 
which is consistent with Mexican economic growth over this period. Finally, the 
proxy for liquidity, Liq Index, presents an average of 5.87 with a standard 
deviation of 2.19. It goes from an average of 6.32 (2000-2006) to an average of 
5.59 (2007-2013). The difference is significant with a Pr(T>t)=0.00 and can be 
once again explained by the consequences that arose from the 2008 crisis, in which 
the stock markets from all over the world lost credibility and trading volumes 
decreased. 
Table 19 Difference of mean test Duality Mexico 
Table 18 includes information of the difference of mean test for the variable CEO duality in which 
Mean (0) Information for companies without CEO duality and Mean (1): Information for companies 
with CEO duality 
 Mean (0) SD Mean (1) SD Pr 
TobinsQ 1.61 2.55 1.95 3.90 0.11 
Boardsize 11.32 3.45 12.19 3.87 0.00 
PercIndepDirec 0.46 0.18 0.44 0.17 0.20 
LogSales 16.03 1.76 15.81 1.74 0.06 
FamOwn 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.04 
GDP growth 2.47 2.66 2.43 2.77 0.84 
Liq Index 5.99 2.24 5.70 2.11 0.05 
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Table 19 provides evidence of the differences between companies with different 
leadership structures (Duality and no duality). This table presents the results of a 
t-test taking CEO Duality as the fixed variable. My most important variable, Tobin´s 
Q (proxy for value), did not change significantly between groups. It changed from 
1.61 to 1.95 respectively having a non significant difference at Pr(T>t)=0.11. This 
shows that firm value does not change significantly between two different 
leadership structures. 
On the other hand, variables such as board size, log sales, family ownership and 
liquidity index had different results. For these variables the difference between 
means was statistically significant. Board size for non-dual companies has an 
average of 11.32 while board size for dual companies has an average of 12.19; this 
difference (0.87) is statistically significant which shows that companies with 
Duality have larger boards. Sales, the proxy for size also present significant 
differences, while non dual companies show an average of 16.03 dual companies 
show an average of 15.81 meaning that companies with CEO duality tend to be 
smaller than non dual ones. Companies without CEO duality tend to be on average 
less concentrated. Lastly, dual companies show a significantly lower liquidity index 
(5.70) than non-dual companies (5.99) which means that during the period from 
2000 to 2013 dual company stocks were traded less than non dual companies. 
4.4.2 Regression Model 
 This study uses Tobin’s Q, as most of the literature does, as the dependent variable 
and included not only the variable to be tested (Duality) but also some control 
variables. These control variables commonly found in the literature are board size, 
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board composition, family ownership, adoption of a Corporate Governance law, 
GDP growth, size (Log sales) and liquidity index as well as the lagged value of the 
dependent variable which is expected to be significant because a previous positive 
and significant Tobin´s Q might affect Tobins` Q positively for the next period. The 
usage of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation as an 
independent variable has been used in the literature (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Klein, 1998 and Weir et al., 2002). Most governance literature argues for either a 
positive or negative relationship between mechanisms such as board size, board 
independence, and ownership structure with firm value. Since it is expected for 
these variables to have a relationship to firm value they will be controlled for to 
isolate CEO duality`s impact on value. 
Results for an initial model that did not take into account time varying effects are 
presented in column (a) in table 21 These results show Corporate Governance law 
as having a significant positive relationship with firm value. After controlling for 
time varying effects by including year dummy variables, a final model was 
developed:  
           (        )
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Tobin´s Q, a proxy for value, was used as the dependent variable as most of the 
literature does (Yermack, 1996, Coles et al, 2007, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, Amir 
et al, 2010). Second, the most important variable, CEO duality, is included to test 
whether the leadership structure affects firm value, while the other important 
governance control variables are also included. The study used the percentage of 
independent directors as a proxy for board independence. If board independence, 
as agency theory suggests, affects value positively it can be expected for its 
regression coefficient to be positive.  
As for the control variables the study uses sales as a proxy for size as most of the 
literature does (Coles et al, 2007, Yermack, 1996, Ameer et al, 2010). Prior 
research mentions that as firms grow they have more needs for contracting and 
thus require larger boards (Coles et al, 2007). The study follows this argument and 
expects sales to have a positive relationship not only with board size but also with 
firm value. Finally the regression includes year dummy variables that will allow 
controlling for the effects that each year´s growth could have on Tobin´s Q. 
4.5 Results 
The study checked for the multi-colinearity among the different variables. As can 
be seen in Table 20 there is no abnormally high correlation between variables thus 
providing validity to regression results. High correlation (within normal ranges) is 
present between Tobins Q and lagged Tobins Q (0.6322 - expected since they are 
the same variable), Sales and Board Size (0.3333 – expected as mentioned before), 
Liquidity index and Log Sales (0.5848 – expected since bigger companies have 
higher financing needs and thus tend to be traded more). 
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Table 20 Correlation Matrix Mexico 
Correlation Matrix for the complete sample 
 TobinsQ Boardsize PercInd
epDirec 
Duality Law Fam.Own  LogSales FamOw
n 
TobinsQ 1         
Boardsize Ss      -0.0596 1        
PercIndepD
irec 
0.0577 -0.1665 1       
Duality 0.0536 0.1108 -0.0404 1      
Law 
Fami 
0.117 0.0016 0.1183 -0.014 1     
Fam. Own -0.0092 0.3333 -0.0756 -0.072 0.02 1    
GDP 
growth 
0.0725 0.0245 -0.0753 0.0694 0.1 0.2832 1   
Liq Index -0.0225 -0.0538 0.006 0.0076 -0.2 -0.0535 -0.0187 1  
L.TobinsQ 0.0197 0.2779 0.1192 -0.071 -0.2 0.5969 0.1349 -0.035 1 
Results from the original models regression reveal no relationship between any of 
the governance related variables and firm value except for law implementation. 
Duality, board size, board independence and family ownership showed no 
significant relationships at any level while law turned out to be positively and 
significantly related to firm value, however when controlling for time varying 
effects (see column h) this positive relationship disappeared. 
Results of the regression of the adopted model, presented in column (h) on Table 
21 showed an R-Squared of 0.4411, suggesting that 44.11% of the variations of 
Tobin’s Q of the sample are explained by the independent variables.  
Duality, the dummy variable for leadership structure was positive (0.145) but not 
significant therefore leading to the conclusion that in the Mexican case, CEO duality 
does not have any impact on firm value supporting hypothesis 1b.  This shows that 
the division between CEO and chairman of the board does not have any relevance 
to the creation of value. Second, results show that there is no linear relationship 
between Tobin´s Q and board size (non-significant coefficient of -0.017). The low 
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magnitudes and the p-values are conclusive and show that the number of members 
in the board of directors does not appear to have any impact in firm´s value. Third, 
percentage of independents, the proxy for board independence was positive at 
0.062 but again non-significant providing evidence of board independence not 
being related to value.  It is important to report that results on governance 
variables (CEO duality, board size and board independence) and their relationship 
with value do not support agency theory which might mean that agency theory is 
not applicable for emerging markets. Fourth, family ownership, the dummy 
variable that showed whether the company was family owned or not was also 
positive but non-significant (coefficient of 0.214). This provides evidence to 
conclude that family ownership is not an important variable in generating value for 
Mexican firms. Two of the other control variables, GDP growth and Lagged Tobin´s 
Q, show significant relationships with Tobins Q. These results provide validity to 
the model since it can be expected for both of them to be related to value. The GDP 
growth coefficient is positive with a 0.126 and Lag (1 year) of Tobin´s Q 0.649 both 
having a level of significance of 1%. The liquidity index had a positive but non-
significant relationship while Log of Sales was negative but small in magnitude and 
non-significant. 
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4.5.1 Robustness tests 
Different regressions were run to test for robustness. Table 21 summarizes 
all the complementary regressions that were made from columns (b) to (g). 
Regression (b) eliminates Lag Tobin´s Q coefficient and thus leading to a 
decrease in the R-squared of near 35%. Regression (c) takes as control 
variable of GDP growth a dummy variable that takes the value of one when 
GDP growth is over zero and zero if not, this shows very similar results as 
the ones presented in the first column. The next two regressions (d-e) take 
ROA or the logarithmic value of ROA+1 as independent variables leading to 
a low R-squared.  Regressions on columns (f) and (g) changed the 
dependent variable, with ROA replacing Tobin´s Q in the equation. Under 
these scenarios not a single variable is significant thus giving validity to the 
model. 
 It is important to mention the possibility of reverse causation between firm 
value (Tobin’s Q) and duality, meaning that good or bad results might drive 
shareholders to either change the leadership structure of the company. In 
order to check against reverse causation a complementary regression was 
run with Tobin´s Q as an independent variable and duality as the dependent 
variable (column (i) of Table 21) and no significant relationship was found 
between these variables.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
This paper studied the effects of CEO duality on firm value in an emerging market 
focusing on Mexico. This is important since previous research on CEO duality`s 
impact in firm value is mixed and inconclusive. Latin American countries such as 
Colombia, where previous research was conducted support agency theory and do 
not allow the same individual to be both CEO and Chairman of the board. Since 
other governance variables such as board independence and size might have an 
impact on value they were used as control variables in the study. 
This research found that CEO duality has no impact on value for Mexico thus 
showing that different leadership structures do not affect value within an 
emerging market context such as Mexico.   
Most of the governance variables included in this research do not appear to have a 
definite relationship with value for emerging markets therefore further research 
on this topic is needed.. 
Further research can be conducted on different governance variables (such as 
management ownership, block holder ownership, compensation, board dynamics 
and specific family characteristics – generation, involvement) and their 
relationship with value to be able to assess whether governance is really important 
in emerging markets. These variables were not included in this research and might 
provide deeper knowledge for academics, investors and regulators. 
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5 Conclusions, Limitations and Opportunities for further research 
5.1 Conclusions 
Effective Corporate Governance plays an important role in companies in the 
emerging markets by providing easier access to financing, by lowering the cost of 
capital, by reducing the risk of financial crisis and by creating wealth (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2012). To find whether it is effective in different economies requires 
vast research. This thesis provides evidence of the relationship between Corporate 
Governance mechanisms such as board size and composition with firm value for 
Colombia and Mexico. It provides evidence of the relationship between the 
adoption of Corporate Governance Laws and firm value for the same countries.  It 
also provides evidence of the relationship between CEO Duality and firm value for 
Mexico where CEO duality is permitted. 
Results from Colombia and Mexico show no relationship between board size and 
composition and firm value.  Findings for Colombia and Mexico support Lehn et al. 
(2009) and Boone et al. (2007) who found no relationship between board size and 
firm value. They also support Barnard and Rosenstein (1998), Hermalin and 
Weisenbach (2001), De Andres et al (2005) and Baghat and Black (1998) who also 
found no significant relationship between independence and firm value. 
CEO duality, which is only allowed in Mexico, shows no significant relationship 
with firm value. This indicates that the leadership structure of Mexican companies 
does not affect its value. Findings from this research support authors such as 
Faleye (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Vintila and Gherghina (2012), Braun, Sharma 
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(2007), Raluca (2013) and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) who found no relationship 
between CEO duality and firm value. 
Previous Literature reports no relationship between the adoption of the Corporate 
Governance laws and firm value. For example, Linck et al. (2005), Wintoki (2007) 
and Basu and Dimitrov (2005) in their research on Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact on 
firm value found no significant relationship between Corporate Governance 
reforms and firm value. Price et al. (2011) found no relationship between 
Corporate Governance recommendations (code of best practices) and firm value 
for Mexico. However, results from this study provide mixed views. In particular, 
the findings of this study reveal no significant relationship between show that the 
Corporate Governance laws and firm value for Mexico. In contrast, evidence from 
Colombia shows a positive relationship between the adoption of Corporate 
Governance law and firm value. 
5.2 Contributions and recommendations 
This research contributes to knowledge and proposes useful recommendations to 
investor, managers and regulators in the emerging markets of Colombia and 
Mexico. 
The lack of a relationship between both board size and independence with firm 
value show that conventional wisdom and intuition based on Agency theory is not 
applicable and thus its straightforward implementation will probably not create 
value. Both managers and Investors – shareholders- in their quest for value 
creation via the appointment of an effective board of directors should focus more 
on the company’s needs (monitoring, advising) and realities (ownership, size, etc.). 
Regulators and stock exchanges can use this research´s results in future 
adjustments to regulations and recommendations that can promote capital 
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markets development in the region. The MILA Intergrated Stock Market 
(Colombia-Mexico-Peru and Chile) has put special emphasis for 2015 and 2016 in 
developing better governance practices for its listed companies. 
The findings of this research provide useful insights for the corporate governance 
practices and policy making in emerging markets like Colombia and Mexico. One of 
the key issues highlighted in the research is that each country needs to develop 
corporate governance systems that are best suited to their business environment. 
As shown in this research, unlike the developed western markets, board size and 
higher percentage of independent directors does not seem to matter. This suggests 
that in emerging markets like Colombia and Mexico, investors do not seem to be 
overly concerned about these issues as long as firms tend to perform well. 
5.3 Limitations and opportunities for research 
This study represents a small portion of all possible Corporate Governance 
research for Latin America. It provides evidence of the relationship between two 
board attributes (size and composition), of CEO Duality and the adoption of 
Corporate Governance laws with value for only Colombia and Mexico. Limitations 
deal primarily with the data sample used since evidence only included listed 
companies for a period of 10+ years, which represents a small percentage of all 
companies and all observations in these two markets. Other countries were 
excluded such as Argentina, Venezuela, Peru and Chile.  
Other limitations of this study pertain to the limited number of Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms studied. 
These limitations provide interesting opportunities for further research in topics 
such as board capital, board diversity, frequency of meetings, management 
compensation, ownership, etc. 
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Both Colombia and Mexico have small capital markets where only a few companies 
have access to equity financing, which means that most companies use debt 
financing. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012) propose further research on the 
Corporate Governance of financial institutions. 
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